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The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in the establishment of fifteen sovereign
nations and a number of separatist states concentrated in the greater Black Sea region.
The latter, so-called de facto states, are the result of frozen conflicts that emerged as
Moscow’s grip over its territory weakened in the waning years of the USSR and dormant
ethno-religious tensions erupted into internecine conflict. Separatists, ultimately with
help from Moscow, were able to enshrine victories on the battlefield through ceasefires
with metropolitan states that have held for over two decades. However, the issues
surrounding these pseudo-states remain unsettled, and attempts at conflict resolution and
reconciliation have been complicated by many factors, including Russian interests and
involvement in the region, national historical memory and demographics, and
international norms and laws that favor the status quo. This thesis examines the de facto
states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria, and assesses the
extent to which Crimea represents a paradigm shift in Russian policy towards separatist
movements. Ultimately, the emergence and intractability of frozen conflicts, the results of
Soviet and Russian policies respectively, and the entrenchment of de facto states in the
greater Black Sea region contribute to regional instability while ensuring Moscow’s
continuing hegemony in its near abroad.
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INTRODUCTION

Overview
The fall of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and the bipolar world
order, it also signaled the death knell of the world’s last great empire of the 20th century.
On the heels of this institutional collapse came an outbreak of secessionist movements
resulting in the establishment of fifteen sovereign, internationally recognized states and a
number of de facto states concentrated in the greater Black Sea region (Figure 1). Despite
the immediate proliferation of independence movements in the post-Soviet space,
statehood has not been universally realized in the twenty-five years since the dissolution
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), especially among de facto states that
emerged in the early 1990s as a result of so-called “frozen conflicts.”
The emergence and intractability of frozen conflicts, the results of Soviet and
Russian policies respectively, and the entrenchment of de facto states in the greater Black
Sea region contribute to regional instability while ensuring Moscow’s continuing
hegemony in its near abroad. Many of the issues surrounding these de facto states remain
unsettled and the region’s frozen conflicts are complicated by unique historical
circumstances, demographics, and international law, which prevent successful conflict
resolution and reconciliation. Within this context, this thesis examines the de facto states
of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria, and assesses the extent
to which Crimea represents a paradigm shift in Russian policy towards separatist
movements.
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Figure 1. Map of the Greater Black Sea Region (Source: Wikicommons)

The first chapter of this thesis provides a frame of reference for looking at frozen
conflicts and de facto states in the Russian near abroad and defines key terms and themes.
The second chapter discusses Russia’s historical role in the greater Black Sea region and
assesses its geopolitical imperatives in its near abroad, as defined by its strategic culture.
It concludes by looking at the major catalysts that allowed frozen conflicts to emerge in
the post-Soviet space. The third chapter looks at five case studies, focusing on their
origins, outbreak, Russia’s involvement, implications, attempts at reconciliation, and
immediate and long-term forecast. It discusses four frozen conflicts from the end of the
Cold War, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria, and a more
recent conflict, Crimea, which may represent a significant shift in Russian policy towards
these pseudo-states. The last chapter looks at the current condition of these frozen
conflicts and describes the uneasy stasis in which they exist. It also details the legal issues
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preventing either reconciliation between belligerents or international acceptance of
separate statehood. It furthermore looks at the cost of the status quo and anticipates the
ways in which these conflicts will conclude, whether through eventual local and
international acceptance of sovereignty, forceful reintegration with metropolitan states, or
annexation.

Definitions
Frozen Conflict. A frozen conflict is generally defined as a war in stasis where
formalized combat is halted but the underlying causes of the conflict still exist without a
permanent peace treaty or agreed upon political framework towards reconciliation.
Placing these in the context of inflamed ethno-religious tensions in the post-Soviet space,
an article from the Journal of Politics and Minority Issues in Europe explains frozen
conflicts as “those in which violent ethno-political conflict over secession has led to the
establishment of a de facto regime that is recognized by neither the international
community nor the rump state from which the secession occurred.”1 Furthermore, the
involvement of internal and external actors in preventing a resolution to the conflict has
also come to define a frozen conflict in the post-Soviet space and distinguishes it from
other minority disputes. The metropolitan states from which these regions seceded are
either unwilling or unable to alter the status quo towards resolution largely due “to the
potential backlash from exogenous actors.”2

1

Mary Alice C. Clancy and John Nagle. “Frozen Conflicts, Minority Self-Governance, Asymmetrical
Autonomies: In Search of a Framework for Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution,” International
Conflict Research Initiative (2009): 14.
2
Ibid.
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The term frozen conflict is something of a misnomer as it implies that there is
little political or military activity occurring. Unmistakably, these are festering conflicts,
with the potential to spillover at any time, as evidenced by the 2008 Russo-Georgian War
and outbreaks in fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh since 2014. These conflicts may be held
by ceasefires but their underlying causes are still considered very much unresolved in the
hearts and minds of the citizens within these states and regions.
De Facto State. Frozen conflicts within the post-Soviet space have resulted in the
creation of de facto states. De facto states “refer to polities that exist within the
boundaries of recognized, de jure (i.e. by law) states.”3 They exist
…where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power
through some degree of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has
achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given
population in a defined territorial area, over which effective control is maintained
for an extended period of time.4
However, these polities exist in a state of legal uncertainty and are not recognized by the
international community. They have no lawful claim to their territory as, according to
international law, they are recognized as belonging to another legal state. This does not
prevent them from trying to enter into relations with other states in order to gain
recognition as an independent state.5
In order to be recognized as a sovereign state, an entity must fulfill the obligations
set forth in the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933. A
territory must have “(1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory, (3) a government,

3

Michael S. Bobick, “Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States,”
Anthropology Today 30 (2014): 3.
4
Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 14.
5
Ibid., 15.
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and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.”6 The post-Soviet de facto
states, namely Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and, most
recently, Crimea, fulfill all but the last obligation. The only difference between these
polities and a lawful state lies in the former’s non-recognition.7
Nationalism. Nationalism, at its most basic, is loyalty to a nation extending from
a sense of national consciousness. Nationalism drives a population to place emphasis on
promoting its nation’s culture, interests, and independence. In Blood and Belonging:
Journey into the New Nationalism, Michael Ignatieff writes
As a political doctrine, nationalism is the belief that the world’s peoples are
divided into nations, and that each of these nations has the right to selfdetermination, either as self-governing units within existing nation-states or as
nation-states of their own. As a cultural idea, nationalism is the claim that while
men and women have many identities, it is the nation that provides them with
their primary form of belonging. As a moral idea, nationalism is an ethic of
heroic sacrifice, justifying the use of violence in the defense of one’s nation
against enemies, internal or external.8
This understanding of nationalism helps to explain what motivated the territories
discussed in this thesis to seek separation from their metropolitan state.
Separatism. Separatism is the act of separating a group of people from a larger
body on the basis of any number of factors, including ethnicity, religion, and culture. In
this context, “Separatism occurs when a subset of a state’s population declares their
independence in defiance of the de jure state.”9 In some cases, as with the fifteen former
Soviet Republics, separatism resulted in statehood. However, the five case studies

6

Ibid.
Ibid., 16.
8
Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (New York: The Noonday
Press, 1995), 5.
9
Bobick, “Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States,” 3-4.
7
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presented in this thesis have not had their independence recognized by more than a
handful of states.
Greater Black Sea Region. The frozen conflicts and de facto states that are
discussed in this thesis are located in the greater Black Sea region (Figure 1). For the
purposes of this thesis, this area includes nations that border the Black Sea and those in
its immediate periphery, namely Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey,
Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and Ukraine.

6

RUSSSIA’S ROLE AND INTERESTS

Historical Legacy
Since the late 18th century, Russia has been the hegemon of most of southeastern
Europe and the Caucasus. This area is home to innumerable ethnic and religious groups, a
legacy of the empires that have laid claim to these lands over millennia. In order to
control the region after its initial conquests, the Russian Empire relied on policies that
created and maintained ethno-religious divisions within its holdings. This strategy was
later appropriated and used effectively by the Soviets. It has also become something of a
guiding principle for the Russian Federation, though it does not presently lay physical
claim to territory within the greater Black Sea region, with the exception of Crimea,
unlike its predecessor states.
Peter the Great was Russia’s first great expansionist, enlarging the Tsardom of
Muscovy into the Russian Empire through successful domestic reforms and military
campaigns abroad. After victory over Sweden, Peter took the title of Emperor of All The
Russias and expanded Russian rule to the Baltic Sea. The tsars that succeeded him were
actively engaged in European politics and pushed the borders of Russia to the south and
west. Within a few decades, they annexed Belarus, Poland, Ukraine, and Finland. They
also acquired further territory along the Black Sea, including seizing Crimea from the
Ottomans in 1783 and Bessarabia in 1812. Russia also acquired Transcaucasia from the
Ottomans and Persians in the 19th century and fought a long and bloody conflict to
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solidify its claims in the North Caucasus from 1817 to 1864. Further territory in Central
Asia was later obtained through military campaigns and diplomatic maneuvering.10
While it was conducting military campaigns abroad, Russia also had to deal with
consolidating power within and establishing its authority over the territories it had
already absorbed.
Unlike the traditional empire, most of the acquisitions from this classical
imperial period were of territories that had formed their statehood before
the Russian takeover, or of populations that put up fights to thwart the
Russian advance. Some, like the Poles, had a very strong sense of national
identity.11
However, many of the states and territories within the greater Black Sea region, including
those in Transcaucasia, whose ownership had just been transferred, albeit unwillingly,
from one empire to another, had no common historical memory, sense of statehood, or
cultural homogeneity. Over the course of its rule by the Russian Empire, however,
“…three related processes – the imposition of tsarist rule, the rise of the market and
capitalist relations of production, and the emergence of secular national intelligentsias –
initiated a long transformation of the ethnoreligious communities of [this region] into
more politically conscious and mobilized nationalities.”12 As this region experienced a
nationalist awakening, the Russian Empire met its end and a new political dynasty
emerged in Russia.
As a consequence of the Russian Revolution of 1917, almost all of the annexed
territories of the Russian Empire seceded. Poland and Finland were able to break away
permanently while some, like the Baltic States, only held on to independence for a few
10

Dmitri Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2011), 20-21.
11
Ibid., 21.
12
Ronald G. Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 38.
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decades. The rest, including states within the greater Black Sea region, succeeded only
while Russia was embroiled in a civil war from 1918 to 1921.13
This brief experience with statehood fundamentally changed these territories and
created a shared sense of history that later allowed them to coalesce with some ease into
statehood after the collapse of the USSR. According to Ronald Suny, in the movements
for self-determination
…the brief period of independence [was] transformed into a moment of light to
contrast with the long, dark experience with Soviet rule, which in turn [was]
depicted as the destruction of the national. Repression, forced Russification,
imposed modernization, the suppression of national traditions, the destruction of
the village, even an assault on nature [were] combined in powerful images that
show[ed] Soviet power as the enemy of the nation.14
Shared suffering under communist rule was the rallying cry that later allowed the nations
in the Soviet near abroad to unify and secede in 1991.15
After consolidating power, the nascent Soviet Union worked to solidify its power
at home and in its near abroad. Moscow claimed it was creating a federation, though what
emerged looked almost identical to the Russian Empire, consisting of a large bureaucracy
ruling from an “imperial center.”16 However, the USSR built its empire along ideological
lines, seeking to circumvent the differences in culture, ethnicity, and religion among the
peoples in its periphery states in order to actualize the goals of the Russian Revolution of
1917. “Under Soviet founder Vladimir Lenin -- and later in the early years of Stalin's rule
-- the Soviet government argued that nationalism was the bane of the imperial system.

13

Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story, 21.
Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 101.
15
Ibid.
16
Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story, 23-24.
14
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They tried to develop policies that would transform the multinational Eurasian space into
a unified Soviet, socialist state.”17
As the Soviet empire consolidated under Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the
Bolshevik Revolution and first Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, he
argued, “…national separatism would be reduced by central Russian tolerance and a
willingness to allow national self-determination to the point of independence…”18 This
was largely met with skepticism. However, Ronald Suny writes in The Revenge of the
Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, that “…Lenin’s
notion that non-Russians would be willing to remain within a multinational state was less
a fantasy than another example of his political style, an uneasy combination of hardnosed realism and the willingness to take extraordinary risks.” To Lenin, “Soviet Russia
was conceived not as an ordinary national state but as the first stone in a future
multinational socialist edifice.” He maintained a powerful appreciation for nationalism,
even as he tried to subvert it, arguing
…nationalism and separatism were neither natural nor inevitable, but were
contingent on the sense of oppression that nationalities experienced from
imperialism. He remained convinced that nationalism reflected only the
interests of the bourgeoisie, that the proletariat’s true interests were
supranational, and that the end of colonialism would diminish the power
of nationalist sentiments…19
As such, he did not oppose Finland, Poland, and Ukraine’s bids for independence and
would not task soldiers to forcibly defend the sanctity of the federation. “He was
unequivocal in his public commitment to ‘the full right of separation from Russia of all
nations and nationalities, oppressed by tsarism, joined by force or held by force within
17

Robert Coalson, “How Stalin Created Some of the Post-Soviet World's Worst Ethnic Conflicts,” The
Atlantic, March 1, 2013.
18
Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 82.
19
Ibid., 87.
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the borders of the state, i.e. annexed.’”20 Lenin maintained that the end goal of the USSR
would be the eventual merging of nations; however, this would not be done by force.
Countering Lenin’s idealism, the Bolsheviks set up the People’s Commissariat of
Nationalities under Joseph Stalin immediately after taking power. From 1917 to 1923,
Lenin’s policies towards non-Russian ethnic groups led to tensions with Stalin, an ethnic
Georgian. Throughout this time, “Lenin continued to advocate caution and sensitivity
toward non-Russians, whereas many of his comrades, most notably Stalin and Sergo
Orjonikidze, were less willing to accommodate even moderate nationalists.”21 During this
time, the Commissariat redrew borders and forcibly moved populations, exacerbating
ethnic conflict. Its actions created forced borders “in areas where nationality was very
fluid, like Central Asia. Most of the modern nationalities that we have [today] hadn't even
been formed yet.”22
After Lenin’s death, Stalin took over leadership of the Soviet Union and, as the
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
he deviated from Lenin’s legacy in regards to non-Russian peoples. He recommitted to
maintaining irrational border policies and engaged in large-scale deportations of nonRussian ethnic groups out of border territories to make room for the importation of ethnic
Russians to various states within the federation, helping create and prolong conflicts that
are still present within Eurasia, including some of the frozen conflicts discussed in this
thesis.23

20

Ibid., 83-88.
Ibid., 88-97.
22
Coalson, “How Stalin Created Some of the Post-Soviet World's Worst Ethnic Conflicts.”
23
Ibid.
21
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As these activities were occurring, other, more subversive actions were
undermining the integrity of the USSR. The union’s founders had unwittingly laid the
foundation for its dissolution both through its national policies and bureaucratic structure.
The protective measures intended to unify the federation of Soviet states allowed for the
rise of nationalist tendencies based largely around ethno-religious lines.
During the Russian revolution and civil war “neither nationalism nor socialism
was able to mobilize large numbers of these peoples into the political struggles that
would decide their future.”24 The identity of groups within the empire was largely classbased and strength was found in local and social identity, not in political nationalism. In
the early to mid 20th century, there certainly was not the same degree of national-cultural
identity present in the Soviet peripheral states that later became apparent in the 1980s and
beyond. It is largely the result of Soviet policies that many of these identities were
formed and strengthened.25
As “the first state in history to be formed of ethnic political units, the USSR was a
pseudofederal state that both eliminated political sovereignty for the nationalities and
guaranteed them territorial identity, educational and cultural institutions in their own
language, and the promotion of native cadres into positions of power.”26 Citizens were
denied the right to organize within their states among ethno-religious lines while at the
same time being provided with the means to create or strengthen a national sense of
identity based on shared cultural experiences. Moscow was strengthening territorial
loyalties, which was the opposite of its intentions.

24

Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 80-81.
Ibid., 20.
26
Ibid., 101.
25
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Lenin laid the groundwork for many of the ethno-religious issues that plague the
post-Soviet space. The USSR was designed to be a federation of republics that were
“designated by their nationality and ethnicity.” Each of the Union Republics that were
part of the Soviet federation retained some sovereignty, including the constitutional right
to secede and other symbols of statehood, including “flags, crests, anthems, and political
institutions.”27 To be fair, many of these “features of sovereignty” were merely window
dressing, as power was centrally maintained within Moscow. However, this sense of
individuality and distinction among the republics was institutionalized and, rather than
pacifying the republics, it incited new or renewed nationalism. For example, at the age of
sixteen, each Soviet citizen had to state their ethnicity and record it on the “fifth line” of
their Soviet passport. This further institutionalized the sense that each citizen had a dual
affiliation, first with the USSR and second with one’s ethnic group. It did not allow for
the homogeneity that the Soviets desired.28
Stalin’s border and immigration polices and bureaucratic changes also contributed
to eventual nationalist-driven conflict. “In 1944, in a bid to gain more votes in the soonto-be established United Nations organization, Joseph Stalin allowed the republics to
have their own foreign ministries…”29 While Lenin’s policies had allowed for the
creation of state structures based around ethnicity, these held little power under Stalin and
his successors, “rendering [state] sovereignty a fiction, [as a result] many nationalities
became demographically more consolidated within their ‘homelands,’ acquired effective

27

Thomas De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (New York: New
York University Press, 2003), 131-132. & Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story, 11.
28
De Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War, 131-132.
29
Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story, 11.
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and articulate national political and intellectual elites, and developed a shared national
consciousness.”30
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia maintained interest in its near
abroad but it had a relatively light footprint, as it was also pursuing better relationships
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the West. However, the
election of Vladimir Putin in 2000 heralded a new, or perhaps only renewed, direction for
Russia, necessitating its involvement in and the directing of its near abroad. Domestic
issues and frozen conflicts within states on its periphery are one area of vulnerability that
remains especially susceptible to Russian interference. Putin appears to have looked to
the Soviet playbook as how to use and manipulate regional and national conflicts for
Russia’s gain, using military, political, diplomatic, social, and economic tools to
influence actors in contested regions. The festering of frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet
space has allowed Moscow to renew its hegemony within the region after a post-Cold
War lull in activity and take the role of belligerent or benevolent big brother as the
situation dictates. While its motivations differ in each case, Moscow has intervened in
every frozen conflict discussed in this thesis, both enabling these conflicts to continue
while also propping up the de facto states that have resulted from them.31
In Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States,
Michael S. Bobick writes, “In situations in which the Russian military intervenes in these
contested territories, intervention occurs, not in order to achieve a decisive victory, but
rather to keep the de jure sovereign at bay…”32 Russia craves power and influence over
its near abroad, a symptom of a strategic culture that sees Russia as besieged by external
30

Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union, 124-125.
Bobick, “Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States,” 3.
32
Ibid., 7.
31
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foes, namely the West, and will use any and all tactics to ensure patronage. In
Transnistria, for example, Russia provides passports and de facto citizenship to locals,
along with other “symbolic and material benefits, primarily humanitarian and economic
aid… [Locals] reciprocate in the only way they can: by professing loyalty to Russia.”33
Russia’s actions have the added benefit of destabilizing the greater Black Sea region and
the Caucasus so that Western-leaning countries like Georgia cannot fully assimilate and
join organizations such as the EU and NATO. Thus far, Russia’s costs in keeping these
conflicts just below the boiling point have been low both materially and politically. It
seems likely that it will continue to let conflicts remain unresolved and will continue its
active role in sustaining them through maintaining forces in these areas and providing
economic and military support to de facto regimes.
The policy of fomenting division between the various ethnic and religious groups
within the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union was effective in keeping these
territories quiescent. Until the collapse of the USSR and subsequent withdrawal of Soviet
political and military control among its periphery states in the early 1990s, these policies
worked effectively. However, they did have unexpected consequences, resulting in a
nationalist resurgence among border states that led to a spate of frozen conflicts that
remain unresolved to this day. Under Putin, Russia is working to regain its influence
among periphery states and has returned to imperial and Soviet policies for guidance on
how to use unresolved ethno-religious conflicts for its greater national, regional, and
international goals.

33

Ibid., 8.
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Geopolitical Imperatives
Russia’s strategic culture guides its geopolitical imperatives and has led it to
adopt a somewhat cohesive policy over the last two centuries in regards to non-Russian
peoples with the empire, union, and, now, neighborhood. It is important to gauge Russian
motivations and goals in order to appreciate its relationship with the frozen conflicts and
de facto states in its near abroad. Its current policies in regards to periphery states were
created to serve three goals: to maintain domestic political and economic strength, sustain
hegemony within its near abroad, and ensure relevance and effectiveness as an
international actor. These imperatives were informed by Russia’s history, economic and
political priorities, fundamental security concerns, and desire for relevance and prestige.34
The West met the dissolution of the Soviet Union with great optimism. However,
few seemed to reflect on how the loss of territory and the dismantling of the Russian
empire, in all its manifestations, as geopolitical entity that had lasted for centuries would
affect Russia and its people.
After all, Russia had not been defeated, occupied, or controlled by outside
powers. It was its own elites who had initiated the dissolution of the Soviet
empire and the unbundling of the Soviet Union itself. The central thesis in the
West was, of course, that by throwing off the imperial burden, Russia liberated
itself as much as its former possessions and protectorates, and that it was thus
making itself ready for democracy and integration into the community of free,
democratic, and market-driven nations. The skeptics believed none of that and
feared what they called a Weimar Russia.35
More than twenty years later, these worries seem entirely prescient. The economic and
social implications of the collapse of the USSR were profound and its effects are still felt
within Russia today. Its relations with the rest of the world were similarly affected.

34

Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov, Russian Foreign Policy: Sources
and Implications (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), 93-94.
35
Trenin, Post-imperium: A Eurasian Story, 8.

16

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation needed to create entirely
new foreign and security policies towards the post-Soviet states, policies that would
theoretically be much less aggressive and imperialistic than those of the Soviet Union.36
While doing this, it also attempted to reconcile and reconnect with the West, something
that was not universally accepted in Moscow. Many in Russia believed that the postSoviet space lay within Moscow’s sphere of influence and that hegemony over periphery
states was vital to Russian interests. As Russia has historically played a unique role in
these regions, the argument went, it therefore had both rights and responsibilities towards
them.37
After 1991, Russia laid out a number of imperatives intended to make it feel
secure as it engaged in rapprochement with the West. First, Moscow maintained that it
was essential that it became the chief intermediary between post-Soviet states and the rest
of the world. Second, it did not want any country, especially the United States, or
regional or international organizations, especially NATO or the EU, to gain a foothold in
the region and thereby challenge Russia’s position of influence. Third, it wanted to
prevent any threats to Russian security or influence within these nations. Fourth, it sought
to establish itself as the primary peacemaker and peacekeeper. Finally, it wanted to
maintain predominant economic influence without contributing financially to the same
extent the Soviet Union did.38
This perspective was articulated again on January 25, 1993 when the Russian
Foreign Ministry outlined its foreign policy agenda in the “Concept of Foreign Policy of
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the Russian Federation,” which argued for the need to protect its near abroad and assume
responsibility “for ensuring stability and human rights and freedoms in the space of the
former U.S.S.R.,” including guaranteeing “the protection of rights of Russian citizens
living outside the limits of the Federation.”39 This commitment to the periphery states
was redoubled in a November 1993 military doctrine that emphasized the need for Russia
to protect Russians outside of its sovereign political territory and allowed for it to deploy
troops without international appeal or approval.40
Moscow perceives its near abroad as within its exclusive sphere of influence and
has acted in many of the separatist conflicts within sovereign states on its periphery.
Russia believes that it needs to provide stability to its southern flank and underbelly
through expansion and consolidation of Russian influence at expense of other
international actors. However, the application of its guiding principles towards separatist
movements has been contradictory. For example, it conducted military operations against
one of the first post-Soviet separatist movements in Chechnya in 1994. Unlike the other
conflicts in this thesis, Chechnya is located within Transcaucasia in Russia. Moscow’s
actions, coming at great economic, political, and human cost, were taken to prevent the
Muslim republic’s bid for independence and sought to definitively quell the separatist
movement there. Moscow explained that it acted to maintain territorial integrity in the
North Caucasus due to a fear of rising Islamic fundamentalism41 However, these actions
notwithstanding, its intervention in separatist conflicts in the greater region over the last
twenty-five years have not only been defensive and have frequently occurred as a means
to sustain, rather than subdue, separatist movements.
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Russian policy to reassert hegemony has been met with mixed success. Belarus,
Tajikistan, and Armenia maintain close military and economic ties with Russia. However,
many other former Soviet states have actively worked to distance themselves from
Moscow. This has been met by pushback within Russia. The states in its near abroad
were part of Russia’s imperial holdings well before the 20th century. As such, according
to Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Lowell H. Schwartz, and Catherine Yusupov in Russian
Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications,
Many Russians therefore see these countries as natural partners and allies that are
crucial to Russia’s national interests. A Russia without significant influence in
these countries is less of a descendent of Imperial and Soviet Russia, and is thus
less well aligned with Russians’ view of their nation and its global role. The
refusal of most neighboring post-Soviet countries to align readily and fully with
Russia challenges Russia’s ability to present itself as a global leader, and this
challenge is perhaps more significant at home than abroad. Any country that
makes inroads into this region and builds ties with these countries is seen as doing
so at Russia’s expense.42
Its goals have often put it at odds with its former assets. This is not a unique
phenomenon.
While post-imperial cores are concerned with compensating for their diminished
security, wealth, and assets, post-imperial peripheries are primarily interested in
rapidly creating new national-level institutions to control and manage their newly
bound territory and possessions… In collapsed multinational empires such
structural dynamics will also set into motion a neoimperialist national drive by
post-imperial core elites that conflicts with the nation-building agenda of postimperial peripheral elites.43
This “drive” lay somewhat dormant throughout the 1990s but has resurfaced again since
2008 as the Russian Federation tries to reassert itself and challenge post-Cold War
international boundaries and norms.

42

Oliker, et al., Russian Foreign Policy: Sources and Implications, 93-94.
Alexander Cooley, “Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in the Post-Soviet
Space,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01): 108.
43

19

Perceived betrayals by NATO and the West in the 1990s and Russia’s own
internationally condemned actions against Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine
in 2014 has brought relations between Russia and the West to Cold War-level lows.
Oliker, et al. notes that:
Given the last 200 years or so of Russian history, an outside observer might argue
that Russia is remarkably secure. No foreign state is poised to invade it militarily.
No enemies are plotting imminent attack. Historically high rates of economic
growth persisted for nearly a decade, making Russians substantially wealthier
than anyone imagined they could become in the aftermath of the 1998 economic
crash.44
However, it is clear by public and private statements that Russia feels threatened by the
United States and NATO and considers them to be one of the gravest threats to the
Russian Federation.
Until recently, Russia seemed uneager to use force to assert its will in its near
abroad. It relied mostly on economic and soft power maneuvering along with threats and
blackmail. This changed with the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. Moscow claims its actions
were defensive and intended to deter Georgia from adventurism in its separatist regions.
Despite Russia’s reasoning, it clearly showed a renewed willingness by Moscow to resort
to force.45 Indeed, “Russia’s counterattack was the first case of Moscow using force
against a foreign adversary and invading a neighboring country since the Afghan war
(1979–1989).”46
Following this in 2009, Russia adopted its most aggressive and proactive military
doctrine since the 1970s. In it, Russia rejects American global hegemony and lays out
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five guiding principles for military actions. Then-Russian President Dmitri Medvedev
stated:
‘…protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an
unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be
based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community
abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts
committed against us.’47
It is also made clear that Russia perceives that is has “privileged interests” in regions that
share historical ties with Moscow.48
Adding to the complexity of this doctrine is the fact that Moscow is blurring the
definition of citizenship. Russia has a long-standing policy of supplying passports to
people living within unrecognized de facto states among its near abroad. According to
Jim Nichol of the Congressional Research Service, “Of some 200,000 people in
Abkhazia, 150,000 became Russian citizens; so did 100,000 of 600,000 residents of
Transnistria… The number of people in Crimea (population: just under 2 million) who
hold such passports is estimated to be 60,000.”49 The creation of new pseudo-citizens
means that any conflicts in these areas would affect thousands of Russian passport
holders, thereby fulfilling Moscow’s benchmark for intervention.
Russia also maintains a military presence in the states on its periphery that are
locked in frozen conflicts. This includes “thousands of military base personnel, border
troops, and…peacekeepers.”50 This was authorized by the creation of the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty in 1992, which “pledged members
to consult in the event of a threat to one or several members, and to provide mutual aid if
47
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attacked.” This was reiterated in 2002 among the members of the successor Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Its members currently include Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan.51
Fundamentally, the shock of the Soviet Union’s collapse is still instilled in
Russian memory. While it does not seek a renewal of its former imperial glory, Russia is
still driven by its past, perennial fears and insecurities, and desire for recognition. As
Russian scholar Dmitri Trenin explains,
In place of a historical empire and politico-military superpower status, Russia
seeks to establish itself as a great power. In the eyes of Russia’s leaders, this
means Moscow’s strategic independence from the principal centers of power in
the new century: America and China. Shaping a new role after an imperial decline
and fall is not easy... Performing the same feat without pooling sovereignty with
others is virtually unprecedented.52
Russia’s desire to reassert its hegemony through exploitation of regional conflicts among
its near abroad is better understood when considered in this context.

Catalyst
The weakening of the Soviet Union in the 1980s allowed for a resurgence of
ethno-religious and nationalist movements within the Union Republics. While these
tensions had existed since the federation was created, it started becoming a serious
problem for Moscow in the 1980s. The rise of nationalist movements came at a time
when there was a seeming retreat of leadership and authority from Moscow and a
perceived lack of will to impose its power through force. Central leadership was too late
in realizing the dangers that its ethnic policies had created. “The Soviet state’s deeply
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contradictory policy nourished the cultural uniqueness of distinct peoples. It thereby
increased ethnic solidarity and national consciousness in the non-Russian republics, even
as it frustrated full articulation of a national agenda by requiring conformity to an
imposed political order.”53 The non-Russian minorities long buried within separate
republics still felt a sense of unity that would coalesce into a desire for statehood distinct
both from the Soviet Union and from the republic within which they were, in their eyes,
arbitrarily bound.
The specific legacies of Soviet rule were instrumental to the emergence of frozen
conflicts and de facto states in the greater Black Sea region. The nature of Soviet
federalism shaped “understandings of ethnicity and power in the late 1980s and 1990s
across the post-Soviet space.”54 Stalin codified the idea that ethnicity and territory were
inherently linked. In this way, ethnicity was territorialized. This prevented the Soviet
Union from assimilating its many ethnic groups under one banner and instead the Soviet
Union became a nursery of new states. “In general, the consequences of Soviet ethnic and
nationality policy turned out to be a sort of time-bomb that tended to explode exactly at
the moment when ambitious nation-state-designers crossed, or were about to cross,
specific red lines.”55 These trends, which began under Lenin and continued through the
early years of Stalin’s rule, helped consolidate the idea of national identity among the
Union Republics by allowing and indeed supporting the teaching of “native languages,
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creating national intelligentsia and political elite, and formally institutionalizing ethnicity
in state apparatus.”56
As the Soviet Union weakened, groups that had long felt marginalized looked to
ethnic ties to mobilize and seek political sovereignty. “The legacy of the Soviet
experience was that group rights had to be territorialized to mean anything.”57 Moscow
had allowed these different groups to maintain their autonomy while not allowing them
any meaningful political power. The existence of separate, completely autonomous
regions within the different Soviet Republics led to internal conflicts that were further
exacerbated when the Soviet Union finally collapsed, leading to conflict and separatism.
The Soviet Union had furthermore provided the means for these territories to
claim their sovereignty. “The existing structures of autonomy gave these peoples readymade institution to wield against the capitals of the metropolitan states in which they
lived; elected parliaments, executive agencies, police forces, universities, and all the
trappings of sovereignty were mobilized in the pursuit of independence.”58
While these institutions were in line with the Soviet Union’s original intent of
creating a state that had evolved beyond nationalism, it instead, “had in fact created a set
of institutions and initiated processes that fostered the development of conscious, secular,
politically mobilizable nationalities.”59 The USSR likely should have recognized the
paradoxes inherent in its organization decades earlier, as they increasingly found
themselves vulnerable to its contradictions. “The explosive power of national
identification and the reluctance of the Soviet government to push too hard against it was
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demonstrated vividly” in a number of circumstances, including in Georgia in 1978 when
nationalists fought to keep Georgian Kartuli as the national language. At this time, antiRussian rhetoric was not met with punishment.60 Other would-be separatists did not
overlook Moscow’s reluctance or inability to act decisively in this situation.
Increasing displays of nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s surprised Soviet and
Western scholars, who had largely come to believe that “…the Soviet state had
effectively subdued and integrated the nationalities into the general project of social
transformation.” It was expected that even ethnic non-Russians would choose to
assimilate into Soviet culture. It was only after fifty years that they began to recognize
“the deeply contradictory policies and processes that were creating new capacities for
resistance to the creation of a single sovetskii narod (Soviet people).”61
The Soviet Union attempted to institutionalize and thereby neuter nationalist
tendencies in their attempt to legitimize a state based on socialist and communist
ideology rather than cultural identity. However, nationalism instead became a source of
opposition in the waning decades of the USSR. By 1989, the republics of the Soviet
Union had tied their desire for freedom to their desire for national sovereignty. “In this
sense, 1989 in Eastern Europe was not merely a series of revolts against communism as a
repressive political and social system; it was also a series of national revolts against
Soviet domination…”62
Furthermore, according to Dov Lynch, “perestroika had a catalyzing effect in
each of the conflicts. The collapse of the centralizing and coercive power of the
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Communist Party, combined with the introduction of glasnost and limited free elections,
allowed new political arenas to open, which became theatres in some cases for nationalist
and ethnic mobilization.”63 As the last General Secretary of the Soviet Unions, Mikhail
Gorbachev’s attempted transformation of the Soviet system was the ultimate spark that
ignited today’s frozen conflicts. Separatist regions were finally allowed to give voice to
their issues and mobilize politically. This, coupled with rising fears of ultra-nationalist
metropolitan states and the availability of Soviet weapons and troops, allowed separatists
in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine to take hold of their destinies and declare
independence.64
The power vacuum that emerged after the Soviet Union’s collapse allowed for the
forcible attempts by many groups to seize power and territory to ensure political selfdetermination. After the fall of the Soviet Union, there were “164 ethno-territorial
conflicts within its territory.”65 Amazingly, except for the conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, and the recent
Crimean conflict, “there were no major wars among the Soviet successor states.” The
conflicts that arose were largely internecine, occurring between groups within a
country.66
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After 1991, the newly sovereign former Soviet republics were loathe to give up
any of their restored political power as they believed that separatist movements within
their territories were part of Soviet and later Russian strategy to weaken the states along
its periphery. The autonomous separatist regions that emerged after the Cold War were
also mistrustful of the former Soviet states and international system. “The [state]
recognition process as a whole was regarded as arbitrary and, worse, as deeply unjust.”67
To these regions, the boundaries that had been subjectively drawn by the Soviets and
which had been legitimized by the international community followed the “principles of
political expediency and divide and rule” and had no “consideration for the long-term
viability of these units.”68 Indeed, many of the borders drawn by Moscow early in the 20th
century had purposefully divided ethnic groups into different republics, intended to
weaken these groups.
It is in this convoluted environment that the frozen conflicts and de facto states
discussed in this thesis emerged, with the exception of Crimea. The inherent policies and
structures of the Soviet Union, coupled with the weakening and eventual breakup of the
USSR, fostered antipathy between the peoples of these states and provided the catalyst
for secession.
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CASE STUDIES

Abkhazia
Origin. The Republic of Georgia (Figure 2) is engaged in two frozen conflicts
with de facto states located within its sovereign territory. The first emerged in Abkhazia
where deep-seated ethnic and historical tensions preempted separation between Tbilisi
and Sukhumi. These issues were compounded by Soviet and Russian policymaking and
the actions of both Georgian and Abkhaz nationalist movements of the 1980s and
1990s.69

Figure 2. Map of Georgia Showing Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Adjara (Source: CIA
World Factbook)
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The Abkhaz are a distinct ethnic group separate from other ethnic Georgians that
are the descendants of the Circassians, Turkic peoples from the North Caucasus.70 During
the Soviet era, Abkhazia was a relatively prosperous region. Located on the Black Sea in
Georgia’s northwest, it was a popular vacation spot for Moscow’s elites.71 According to
the last Soviet census, held in 1989, the population of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic (ASSR) was around 525,000, accounting for almost ten percent of
Soviet Georgia’s population. Of these, 45.7% were ethnic Georgians, 17.8% were
Abkhazians, 14.6% were Armenians, 14.3% were Russians, and 2.8% were Greeks.72
During the conflict between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, the Abkhazians, despite not having a
majority in the region, were able to hold off the Georgian military and, since 1994, have
claimed de facto statehood. Unlike Georgia’s other frozen conflict in South Ossetia,
Abkhazia’s stated end goal is independent political sovereignty.73
Abkhazia historically served as a buffer zone between the Russian Empire and
Ottoman Empire in the 18th and early 19th centuries. After the Russian Revolution in
1917, Georgia, including Abkhazia, was granted independence and in 1921 Abkhazia was
granted a short-lived independence from Georgia.
By the end of 1921, the Bolshevik Red Army reasserted control over the Caucasus
and Abkhazia became a Union Republic of the USSR. In 1931, Stalin incorporated the
region into the Transcaucasian Federation, which included Azerbaijan, Armenia, and
Georgia. When the federation dissolved in 1938, Abkhazia was attached to the Georgian
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Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) as an autonomous region, a downgrade from its previous
status as a Union Republic.
The Soviets maintained control of the region and encouraged migration of nonAbkhaz into the region, “in order to make the Abkhaz a minority within their own
homeland.”74 Tbilisi also pursued policies independent of Moscow to ensure that Abkhaz
nationalism was kept repressed. These actions contributed to Abkhazian discontent as
they felt they had been arbitrarily annexed and forced into political subordination to
Georgia. This anger grew throughout the Soviet period.75 “As Georgian nationalism
flourished in the late 1980s, the Abkhaz population, and especially a section of the local
elites, became increasingly restive, fearing their possible cultural and ethnic
disappearance within Georgia.”76 Under the auspices of glasnost, the Abkhaz began to
call for independence.77
Seeing an opportunity provided by the weakening of the Kremlin’s military reach
and attempts at political and economic liberalization throughout the Soviet Union in the
1980s, Abkhazia acted.78 Initially, leaders only wanted Abkhazia to regain its Union
Republic status as the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia. However, as Soviet power
continued to wane, Abkhazia became fearful of what actions Tbilisi would take when left
unchecked by Moscow. Abkhazian leadership changed tactics and warned Gorbachev
and Moscow of an imminent ethnic conflict. To forestall this, they demanded Abkhazia’s
secession from Georgia.79 When this yielded no change, the Abkhaz formally declared
74
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that it was a Union Republic in August 1990, essentially calling for secession from
Tbilisi.80 This act was quickly annulled by Georgia, who had the legal prerogative to do
so. However, its actions resulted in mass demonstrations in Abkhazia that eventually had
to be put down by Russian troops.81 Ethnic tensions rose even further with the election
and short-lived presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in October 1990.82
In July 1991, the Abkhaz Parliament declared that the nation would revert to its
1925 constitution, which described Abkhazia as an independent Soviet Republic united
by a special union treaty with Georgia.83 In response, Georgia attempted to reconcile with
Abkhazia over some of its grievances. However, negotiations broke down by 1992. The
Abkhaz then proposed a treaty relationship that would have established “confederal
relations with Tbilisi that would have preserved Georgia’s territorial integrity.” However,
this proposal was ignored and when the Georgian president was forced into exile in 1992
and replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, the subsequent power struggles within Tbilisi
gave Abkhazia the opportunity to move forward with its plans for independence.
Abkhazia voted to secede on July 23, 1992 and within three weeks, Georgia responded by
launching a military offensive.84
Conflict. Georgia crossed into Abkhazia to forcibly restore its territorial integrity
on August 14, 1992. Initially, the Georgian troops, a mix of government forces and local
militias, did well. However, by the end of 1992 the Abkhaz had regrouped and rearmed
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“with the support of volunteers from the North Caucasus and [Russia],” and they forced
the Georgians back.85
Georgia was not in a potion to engage in a protracted conflict. As such, it had the
UN broker an initial ceasefire in July 1993.86 However, it was broken by an Abkhaz
offensive in September 1993. They captured the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi, forced all
Georgian troops from the region, and expulsed of much of Abkhazia’s ethnic
Georgians.87 In May 1994, Georgia and Abkhazia agreed to a “framework for a political
settlement and the return of refugees.” Russian troops acting under the auspices of CIS
were deployed as peacekeepers on the border of Abkhazia and Georgia.88 In the end, the
thirteen-month war killed around ten to fifteen thousand people and resulted in the
displacement of over 250,000 people, mostly ethnic Georgians.89
The conflict has remained relatively dormant, with a few flare-ups. In May 1998,
fighting broke out when Georgian partisans attempted to take over part of the Gali
district, where thousands of displaced Georgians resided. This effort was rebuffed and
some 40,000 ethnic Georgians were expelled. In late 2001, the conflict seemed primed to
ignite again, when both Abkhazia and Georgia accused each other of engaging in air
strikes on each other’s territories.90 Recent salvos have been limited to political and
diplomatic maneuvering and while both sides remain entrenched, there is little reason to
expect a outbreak in fighting.
Russia’s Involvement. Russia has played a significant role in the Abkhazian
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conflict and reportedly supported both Tbilisi and Sukhumi at different points during the
fighting. Ultimately, Moscow tipped the scales when it helped Abkhaz fighters push
Georgian troops out of the region in 1993. Furthermore, its peacekeeping forces continue
to play a destabilizing force, largely because they do not maintain themselves as an
impartial force.91 The continuing presence of Russian peacekeepers, drawn initially from
the same troops that Tbilisi claims were involved in the conflict on the Abkhaz side,
continues to be a point of contention.
At the time of the conflict, Russia had four military bases within Georgia,
including one in Abkhazia. While Russia did not incite the Abkhaz conflict, it certainly
helped exacerbate it. During the war, it was accused of providing Abkhaz fighters with
“heavy artillery, air cover, and missile launchers.” Tbilisi also contends that Russian
planes based in the Black Sea engaged in bombing campaigns to support Sukhumi.92
While these claims have yet to be substantiated, and are unlikely to ever be, it is clear that
Russia’s actions of training fighters and providing materiel to the Abkhaz cause was
fundamentally important to Georgia’s inability to end the conflict. As Alexander Cooley
writes in Imperial Wreckage: Property Rights, Sovereignty, and Security in the PostSoviet Space, “Without the active involvement of Russian forces stationed in the region,
the conflict could not have escalated to the point of a decisive Abkhazian victory.”93
The continuation of this conflict and the unresolved status of Abkhazia’s
statehood serve Moscow’s interests in a number of ways. Not only does it allow Russia to
continue to hold a military, political, and economic presence in internationally recognized
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Georgian territory, it also prevents Tbilisi from developing stronger regional and
international ties, especially with NATO, which does not offer membership to states with
territorial disputes.
Implications. This conflict continues to have an outsized impact on regional
development and security. In its immediate aftermath, economic losses amounted to
almost $11 billion. Much of Abkhazia’s industry was destroyed or looted and its tourism
sector was destroyed. Abkhazia has also been under trade sanctions since 1996 and it has
largely reverted to subsistence farming. The nation is dependent on support from
international agencies and nongovernment organizations to provide basic social services
for its citizens.94 Another result of the 1996 CIS embargo that “permitted the direct
import only of food products, medical supplies, petroleum products, and household
items” was that many Abkhazians have “resorted to trade along undetected or illegally
sanctioned passageways, including the de facto borders, as well as at its seaports.”95 The
security threats facing a de facto state also necessitate giving the military and security
apparatuses undue influence and funding. This comes at the expense of other
governmental agencies that could conceivably use the nation’s limited resources for more
robust political, social, and economic development.
Georgia continues to be affected by this conflict as well. It was burdened with
over 200,000 displaced persons from Abkhazia at a time when it was still recovering
from post-Soviet economic stagnation.96 Furthermore, Russia continues to have a
presence within legal Georgia territory and Moscow’s 2008 recognition of Abkhazia’s
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independence “has contributed to an increase in Russian military, economic and political
influence in Abkhazia.”97 The rise of smuggling and other criminal activity on Georgia’s
borders further undermines its security. Lastly, the continuation of this unresolved
conflict keeps Georgia from becoming more integrated with the West and prevents it
from achieving NATO membership, one of its most important security goals.
Attempts at Reconciliation. Though the UN has led negotiations since 1994,
there has been little progress in resolving the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Displaced
persons are unable to return to their homes, skirmishes occur periodically between the
two forces, and Georgia continues its trade restrictions on Abkhazia.98 According to
Shireen Hunter in “Borders, Conflict, and Security in the Caucasus: The Legacy of the
Past,“
The main impediment to peace now is the conflict between the Abkhaz insistence
on self-determination, and the Georgian insistence on territorial integrity.
Moreover, Tbilisi is adamant that ethnic Georgian refugees from Abkhazia be
allowed to return to their homes. Even if compromise could be reached on the
issue of independence, the Abkhaz are unlikely to accept the return of Georgian
refugees, because this would once again make them a minority within their own
country.99
Georgia continues to view Abkhazia as an autonomous republic within the Georgian state
and blames the Russian Federation for interfering and prolonging of the conflict.100 To
Tbilisi, the “integration in February 1931 of Abkhazia in the Socialist Soviet Republic of
Georgia offers an incontestable argument… [that] Abkhazia is an indivisible part of the
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Georgian territory.”101 There has been little deviation in this policy over the last twenty
years.
Abkhazia continues to develop institutions of statehood in hopes of receiving
international recognition.102 Currently, however, it is only recognized by its fellow postSoviet de facto states, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh, and, since the
Russo-Georgian War of 2008, that states of Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru.103
Forecast. Ironically, given Russia’s mistreatment of the Abkhaz minority during
its imperial and Soviet rule of the area, Abkhazia now depends on Russian protection to
ensure its de facto sovereignty.104 It has, however, attempted to develop a political system
independent of Moscow. “The Abkhaz arguably also [have] a sharper sense of their own
history and ethnicity, and [take] their independence seriously, despite their great political
and economic dependence on Russia.”105 While there is still strong, near universal
resistance to rejoining Georgia, Abkhazia appears to also be incrementally moving away
from Russia. In 2006, an opinion poll found that 68% of Abkhazians favored joining the
Russian Federation while only 25% preferred an independent Abkhazian state. In 2011,
this drastically reversed with 73% of respondents favoring Abkhazian independence
while only 25% were in favor of joining Russia. In the same poll, only 0.6%, mostly the
few remaining ethnic Georgians within the territory, favored rejoining Georgia.106
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As Abkhazia continues operating as a de facto state, it is becoming more
confident of its abilities to survive as an independent nation.107 Georgia, meanwhile,
remains dedicated to restoring its territorial sovereignty, though without committed
outside mediation and reconciliation efforts, this conflict is likely to linger for decades.

South Ossetia
Origin. South Ossetia (Figure 2) is the second de facto state within Georgia.
While the frozen conflict between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali is largely ethnic in nature, it
differs from Abkhazia in that many Ossetians wish to rejoin with North Ossetia within
the Russian Federation, preferring annexation to independence.108 To the West, this
conflict appeared to be better managed than the one in Abkhazia in the years after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. However, this abruptly changed with the 2008 RussoGeorgian War, the largest conflict in Europe since the Kosovo War in 1999.109
Much like other frozen conflicts in this region, the origins of the South Ossetia
dispute are contested. The Ossetian population consists of two main ethnic groups located
in what is now North and South Ossetia. The Russian Empire conquered North Ossetia in
the 18th century and South Ossetia in the early 19th century. After the Russian
Revolution, North and South Ossetia pushed for the unification of their states. However,
keeping to its policy of divide and rule, Stalin split the regions in 1922 into the
Autonomous Region of North Ossetia within Russia and the Autonomous Oblast of South
Ossetia within Georgia. Both North and South Ossetia petitioned again in 1925 to
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establish a unified Ossetia. However, they were rejected, though North Ossetia would
later be upgraded to an Autonomous Republic.110
Under the Soviet Union, South Ossetia experienced no significant interethnic
issues.111 Unlike Abkhazia, South Ossetia retained an ethnic majority throughout this
time. In 1989, the population was around 100,000 people, 66% were ethnic Ossetians,
29% were Georgian, and the rest were a mix of Russian, Armenian, and Greek.112
However, similar to Abkhazia, rising nationalism in Tbilisi during the period of glasnost
in the 1980s frightened many South Ossetians. One of the catalysts for conflict were
reports that Tbilisi was considering making Georgian Kartuli the official language of the
country. “This was a most unwelcome prospect for the South-Ossetians, only 14 percent
of whom could function in the Georgian language.”113 In response, they voted in 1989 to
upgrade their status to that of an Autonomous Republic, though it kept the territory
nominally under Georgian authority. Fueled by nationalism, the Georgian Parliament
rejected the vote and revoked South Ossetia’s autonomous status, precipitating an armed
conflict.114
Conflict. The resultant war, waged from 1991 to 1992, caused over two thousand
deaths, significant infrastructure damage to the region, and the displacement of over
50,000 ethnic Ossetians, who later crossed into North Ossetia. A ceasefire was called in
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June 1992, brokered by Moscow, and a trilateral peacekeeping force was deployed, again
led by Russia.115
Tensions rose again in 2003 after Georgia’s Rose Revolution. President Mikhail
Saakashvili, fresh off a victory against separatists in Georgian Adjara (Figure 2), “made
the reassertion of Georgian authority over South Ossetia a top priority of his
administration.” Saakashvili also wanted to reorient Georgia to the West, pitting him
against Russia.116 In 2004, Saakashvili began an offensive to counter smuggling
operations in South Ossetia. He tightened border controls and sent in hundreds of security
personnel and, reportedly, guerilla forces into the territory. As a counter, Russia allegedly
sent in “several hundred paramilitary elements from Abkhazia, Transnistria, and
Russia.”117 Clashes between both sides ended inconclusively.
Subsequent peace talks between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali in 2005 led to an offer by
Georgia for South Ossetia to attain “autonomy equivalent to North Ossetia’s in Russia,
plus quotas for representation in the national parliament, executive branch, and
judiciary.” However, as this offer came after what many in South Ossetia perceived to be
Georgia’s inability to change the status quo militarily, it was summarily rejected and
South Ossetia voted in November 2006 to reaffirm its independence from Tbilisi.118
The frozen conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia escalated again in August
2008. This was the third such conflict between them since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Unlike the previous two, Russian armed forces were openly involved. In fact,

115

Fawn, “The Kosovo—and Montenegro—Effect,” 273 and Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States:
Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States, 30-31.
116
Hunter, “Borders, Conflict, and Security in the Caucasus: The Legacy of the Past,” 119-120.
117
Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,
24-30.
118
Closson, “Georgia's Secessionist De Facto States: From Frozen to Boiling,” 2.

39

Moscow played a significant role in escalating tensions prior to the conflict. In March
2008, the State Duma had outlined two conditions for potentially recognizing Abkhazia
and South Ossetia’s independence. They were “Georgia’s accession to NATO and use of
force against the two self-proclaimed republics.” Furthermore, President Putin directed
financial assistance to both South Ossetia and Abkhazia in order to deepen ties.119 Russia
also engaged in military brinksmanship with Tbilisi, which finally resulted in open
conflict.
War broke out in August with a Georgian offensive against Tskhinvali, the
administrative capital of South Ossetia, and Russian troops dispersed throughout the
region. Russia responded with a counterattack that drove Georgian troops from South
Ossetia. Russian forces then launched further air, land, and sea attacks within Georgia
and emplaced troops in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It followed up with a political
volley by later recognizing these de facto states’ claims of independence from Georgia.120
By August 12, Russia had achieved its military and political goals. ThenPresident Medvedev declared that “the aim of Russia’s operation for coercing the
Georgian side to peace had been achieved and it had been decided to conclude the
operation.... The aggressor [Georgia] has been punished and suffered very heavy
losses.”121 For its part, Georgia accepted a French-brokered ceasefire that “left Russian
forces in control of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and ‘security zones’ in undisputed Georgian
territory.”122 The plan also committed Georgia
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…not to use force, to halt hostilities, to provide full access for humanitarian aid,
to withdraw Georgian forces to the places they were usually stationed prior to the
conflict, to withdraw Russian forces to positions prior to the outbreak of
hostilities (although they were permitted to implement security measures in the
zone of the conflict until international monitors were in place), and to open
international discussions on ensuring security and stability in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.123
By all measurements, this was a successful campaign and ceasefire for the Russian-allied
Abkhazia that left Georgia with both damaged military and economic infrastructure and
diminished domestic and international political standing.
Russia’s Involvement. Similar to Abkhazia, South Ossetia’s continued existence
as a de facto state is the result of Russia’s desire to maintain a presence in its near abroad.
In the early 1990s, claims were raised that Moscow was encouraging Ossetian separatists
as a means to maintain influence over Georgia. While many of these assertions rest on
circumstantial evidence, Russia cannot claim that it played a passive role in the 19911992 conflict, though some Russian troops undoubtedly acted on their own volition in
supporting the Ossetian cause. However, Russia was clearly an active participant by the
end of the conflict and later helped negotiate a ceasefire in 1992 and led peacekeeping
efforts in the region.124
Moscow’s role in inciting conflict was much more transparent a decade and a half
later, when Russia made a committed and unambiguous policy towards deterring Georgia
from forcibly resolving its issues with South Ossetia. “Unlike individual Russian
servicemen who acted spontaneously in the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-1993,
Moscow did not merely support the Russian army’s operation. The Kremlin called it ‘an
operation to compel Georgia toward peace,’ aimed at saving the Ossetian people from a
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full-scale humanitarian catastrophe.”125 This conflict also had important geopolitical
implications that undoubtedly influenced Moscow’s decision to intervene.
The threat of Georgia’s ascension into NATO likely served a fundamental role in
provoking Russian action in 2008. Russian strategic culture rests on its sense of being a
besieged state and the threat of a Western-allied state bound by a treaty of
collective defense with Russia’s current and historic adversaries compelled it to action.
Putin is also an opportunist by nature and he likely perceived an opportunity for Russia to
undermine NATO and the United States by inciting Georgia to start a conflict it could not
win before it was bound by Article Five obligations.126 “By roundly defeating a U.S.
friend, the Russian leadership aimed to undermine Washington’s credibility as a security
patron of pro-U.S. governments in the CIS.”127 Moscow’s actions were incredibly
effective. The result of the five-day war was that “the United States seemingly
demonstrated its unwillingness to put itself in danger to defend a friend, while Russia
[showed] it had no such problems.”128 Along the Russian periphery, NATO countries
questioned Washington’s dependability and the efficacy of their security guarantee.
Coupled with Putin’s goading, American ambiguity over its commitments to
defend Georgia potentially led Saakashvili to start a conflict he had no way of winning.
Without active American political and, more importantly, military support, Georgia had
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no chance in achieving victory, though Saakashvili may have believed his U.S.-trained
forces could achieve some success against the separatist. Because of this miscalculation
by Tbilisi, Russia achieved many of its stated and implied goals during the conflict. In a
2011 speech to Russian soldiers based in Vladikavkaz on the Georgian border, Russian
President Medvedev said that NATO would have expanded to many post-Soviet
republics but for the Russo-Georgian War. If Russia “had faltered back in 2008, the
geopolitical situation would be different now… and a number of countries which
(NATO) tried to deliberately drag into the alliance would have most likely already been
part of it now.”129 The conflict provided Russia with a relatively low-cost way to test
American resolve in defending states with which it does not have formal security
guarantees. America’s lack of a military response had the effect of increasing Russian
confidence at home and lowering faith in America internationally.
Since the conflict, it has been reported that Russian aims were not only to
consolidate control over Georgia’s breakaway regions but also to depose then-President
Saakashvili through occupying the capital by directly “killing or arresting Saakashvili, or
indirectly by triggering his overthrow…Saakashvili’s survival as the popularly elected
president was a major accomplishment of the diplomacy of the EU and the United States
that ended Russia’s offensive.”130 Russia may not have accomplished all of its goals but it
certainly capitalized on what it saw as a vulnerable relationship between Georgia and the
West. Saakashvili’s miscalculation soured his popularity at home and abroad. His
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coalition also suffered a number of domestic scandals, which led his party to heavy losses
in Georgia’s 2012 parliamentary elections.131
Implications. The intractability of the South Ossetian conflict has deeply
impacted local, regional, and international actors. South Ossetia is plagued by economic
weakness, political instability, and criminal elements in its society. The first South
Ossetia war in the 1990s caused significant damage to industry and infrastructure and the
displacement of nearly half its population.132 The second conflict also resulted in what
Georgia calls the ethnic cleansing of over 20,000 Georgians from South Ossetia, around
one-third of the region’s pre-war population.133 It has yet to recover. South Ossetia
remains to be largely dependent on Russia for both economic and military survival.134
This conflict continues to plague Tbilisi. It is unable to unify its country and must
invest heavily in its security and military infrastructure at the expense of social,
economic, and political development. The closed borders between South Ossetia and
Georgia also has serious economic implications. However, the most important
consequence of this conflict is that it prevents Tbilisi’s greater integration with the West.
It joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) program in 1994 and was assured that it
would eventually become a full-fledged NATO member in the late 2000s. However, the
Russo-Georgian War in 2008 had many questioning that promise.
After the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict, several allies raised heightened
concerns that Georgia was not ready to be granted a MAP because of the
destruction of much of its military infrastructure by Russia, the uncertain status of
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the breakaway regions, and the uncertain quality of conflict decision-making by
Georgia’s political and military leadership.135
In the aftermath of the 2008 war, Tbilisi was largely blamed for its outbreak and it
continues to work to regain trust among its Western security partners.
The conflict has also affected Russia both positively and negatively. It has
allowed Moscow to maintain a physical presence on its periphery. However, its needling
of Tbilisi and incitement of the 2008 war resulted in the withdrawal of Georgia and
Ukraine from CIS.136 As Tbilisi restores its ties with the West, more issues may emerge
from Russia’s presence in Georgia’s separatist regions.
Attempts at Reconciliation. The 2008 Russo-Georgian War and Moscow’s
subsequent recognition of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence has set back
reconciliation efforts between these territories and Tbilisi. Russia is the only state with
the power to resolve these conflicts. However, it has shown no real desire to do so. The
international community is impotent to force reconciliation without Moscow’s support
and dependence on Russian involvement ensures that it can dictate the terms of its role in
the region. As long as Moscow sees the continuation of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict in
its best interests, there will be little change on the ground. Likewise, Tbilisi has not
changed its opinion on the status of South Ossetia and continues to look for ways to
reconcile the breakaway region with Georgia as a whole. However, it is unlikely that
Georgia will attempt to force reintegration within the foreseeable future, given the
disastrous results of the 2008 war.
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Forecast. South Ossetia is working to develop instruments of statehood in hopes
of receiving international recognition or Russia’s blessing to reunify with North Ossetia.
The latter seems unlikely, as Russia made no moves to annex South Ossetia following the
2008 war. This response was dictated by political expediency and realism, as it would be
difficult to absorb the deeply impoverished South Ossetia.137 Prior to the 2008 war, only
other post-Soviet de facto states, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh,
recognized South Ossetia. Since the conflict, Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru
granted recognition to Tskhinvali.138

Nagorno-Karabakh
Origin. The unresolved conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over NagornoKarabakh (Figure 3) continues to contribute to greater regional instability. While this
region has been subject to competing claims of ownership for centuries, the situation
deteriorated and took an especially bloody turn in the early 20th century and again during
the fall of Soviet Union. A stalemate in Nagorno-Karabakh, characterized as one of “no
peace, no war,” has persisted for the last twenty years, though the situation is much more
volatile and dangerous than other frozen conflicts in the region. Frequent outbreaks in
fighting on the border and increasingly bellicose rhetoric by leaders in Armenia and
Azerbaijan lead observers to believe that the conflict may escalate quickly.
Nagorno-Karabakh lies at the crossroads of empires and has been subject to
conflicts over its sovereignty for centuries. While the area is small, around 1,700 square

137

Closson, “Georgia's Secessionist De Facto States: From Frozen to Boiling,” 3 and Lynch, Engaging
Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States, 30.
138
Tekushev, et al., Abkhazia: Between the Past and the Future, 19.

46

miles, it was, until recently, home to an ethnically and religiously diverse population.
Throughout much of history, it was forcefully passed back and forth between the
Ottoman Empire and Persian Empire. However, in the 19th century, the Russian Empire, a
rising power in the volatile Caucasus, annexed the area. While Russian control was
largely uncontested until the 1917 revolution, it was unable to prevent large-scale ethnic
clashes that engulfed Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1905 and continued intermittently until
the communists reestablished control of the area in 1921. Tens of thousands of
Armenians and Azerbaijanis were killed, which entrenched a deep hatred between the
two groups that was only kept in check as long as the Soviets held absolute control over
the region.139

Figure 3. Map of Azerbaijan Showing Nagorno-Karabakh (Source: CIA World Factbook)
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In 1922, all the states of the Caucasus were incorporated into the Soviet Union,
forming the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic.140 Within a year, the
territory was organized into the modern states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The
contested area of Nagorno-Karabakh was designated as an autonomous region and was
attached to Azerbaijan by Stalin, then the Soviet Nationalities Commissioner. This was
done largely for economic purposes and in order to keep Azerbaijan from being
ethnically homogenous.141
Tensions simmered between Baku and its non-Azeri citizens for over 65 years. In
1987, capitalizing on Moscow’s weakness, Karabakhi citizens began demanding
unification with Armenia. A year later, supporters of the annexation of NagornoKarabakh rallied in Yerevan and, in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, a referendum was
held both without Moscow’s blessing and against Azerbaijan’s wishes.142 Violence broke
out in both Armenia and Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh was ethnically cleansed of
Azerbaijanis. There were further atrocities committed by Baku and Yerevan including the
“massacre of more than 600 Azerbaijani civilians of Khojaly city by Armenian and
Russian forces in February 1992 and the Azerbaijan central government’s shelling of
Stepanakert in 1992.”143 These actions mirrored the pogroms that had occurred in the
region earlier in the 20th century and the conflict quickly escalated, with both sides
seeking revenge and attempting to assuage historical prejudice and hatred. This
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unfortunately came as Moscow withdrew from the region, leaving no external force to
check the passions that had be suppressed, but not diminished, for the better part of a
century.
Conflict. Neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan was particularly prepared for the war
that emerged in 1988. Fueled by almost a century of repressed anger and hatred with no
outlet, the war turned ugly very quickly. In the end, however, Armenia clearly had the
advantage. There were strong class distinctions between the two countries that had
emerged during the Soviet period. Armenians were urbanites and generally more
educated and wealthy than their rural, unskilled Azerbaijani counterparts.144 Furthermore,
many Armenians served as officers in the Soviet military while “Azerbaijanis were
prevented from serving in the upper echelons of the Red Army, [and were] restricted to
non-combat positions such as labor or construction battalions.”145 While Armenia was
given tacit support by Russia, Moscow actually supplied weapons and materiel to both
sides, helping to prolong the conflict. Azerbaijan looked to Iran and Turkey, who was
then fighting a Kurdish insurgency, for limited aid and military training. At the same
time, Baku experienced a military coup that toppled the president and placed ex-KGB
chief, Heydar Aliyev, in power.146
As such, Azerbaijan was ultimately unable to compete militarily with Armenia.
As a result, a ceasefire was brokered in July 1994 by Russia and Kyrgyzstan and signed
by representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. All sides promised to
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work towards finding a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh question.147 In the
end, there were over 20,000 to 30,000 casualties on each side from 1988 to 1994. The
conflict also resulted in over one million refugees and displaced persons, over threefourths of which are Azerbaijani. Somewhere around 15 to 20% of Azerbaijani land,
including Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other regions, fell into Armenian hands.148 The
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh became a self-declared republic. However, it is currently
not recognized by any major state, including Armenia.149
Russia’s Involvement. Russia has benefited enormously from the conflict. It has
effectively played both sides of the issue in order to prolong the fighting indefinitely.
From these actions, Russia has profited economically, increased its influence in the
region at the expense of the United States and West, kept Armenia as a tribute state, and
prevented Azerbaijan from fully emerging as an energy competitor.150
Armenia remains dependent on Russia for trade and other economic support and
recently joined a Russian-dominated customs union.151 Russia is Armenia’s top foreign
investor and is responsible for a quarter of all trade. Also, Armenia’s safety is guaranteed
by Russia. It houses somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 Russian soldiers on its soil at
any given time and has provided Russia with a lease to the Gyumri military base until
2044. “Moscow’s military presence in Armenia is the single greatest deterrent to largescale military action from Azerbaijan, which cannot and will not fight Russia
147
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militarily.”152 Armenia is also a signatory to the CSTO which pledges that it will provide
and be provided mutual aid if attacked. Other members include Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Recently, the Armenian president, Serzh
Sargisyan, said, “the strategic partnership between Armenia and Russia is ‘the nucleus of
Armenian security,’ and that membership in the CSTO… is the ‘real guarantee of
Armenia’s security.’”153
However, Azerbaijan also looks to Russia to supply arms and other supplies. In
August 2013, after a visit from Putin to Baku, it was reported that the two countries
signed an arms deal worth an estimated $4 billion.154 Despite this relationship, Russia and
Azerbaijan are, in many ways, competitors in the energy market. Russia holds strong
leverage over the markets that Azerbaijan hopes to supplant and Moscow continues to
use Nagorno-Karabakh as a tool to prevent Azerbaijan from gaining closer ties to the
West and from fully developing a robust regional energy infrastructure.155
Recently, Russia made a number of overtures to both Armenia and Azerbaijan
and offered to mediate a peace deal for Nagorno-Karabakh. Critics argue that President
Putin is “seeking to cast himself as a peacemaker and to alleviate the damage done to
Russia’s image by its actions in Ukraine and the downing of the MH17 flight.”156 Outside
observers question his motives for a number of reasons, including Russia’s
…continuous contribution to the militarization of the region by supplying both
conflicting parties with arms; a massive propaganda campaign blaming the West,
and primarily the U.S., for the increase in tensions; and, as even some Russian
experts admit, attempts to replace the [Organization for Security and Co-operation
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in Europe (OSCE)] Minsk Group mediation efforts and to compel Armenia and
Azerbaijan to accept Russia’s special role in the region.157
Putin hopes to operate outside the existing framework of the Minsk Group and, through
this, pull both Armenia and Azerbaijan closer under Russia’s sphere of influence. While
Russia does not want to see an end to the conflict, it hopes to maintain appearances that it
is doing everything in its power to find a peaceful solution.158
At the same time, Russia cannot allow this region to slip deeper into conflict. If a
new war broke out, Moscow knows that it would likely be drawn in to play a more active
role than in the previous conflict. This would be damaging to its prestige as de facto
hegemon of this region. Furthermore, a conflict has the potential to incite similar
separatist wars in the North Caucasus within Chechnya, Dagestan, or Ingushetia.159 Even
with these concerns, Moscow “…is not genuinely interested in a resolution of the conflict
and is able to frustrate the peace accord at any moment.”160
Implications. Though the war over Nagorno-Karabakh has been under a ceasefire for twenty years, it is still very much a part of the ethos of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The conflict has defined their role in the world since the fall of the Soviet Union and it
will continue to do so until the conflict is resolved.
In many ways, Azerbaijan is the pivot of the entire Caucasus region. Georgia
looks to the West for support while Armenia is still tied to Russia. However, Azerbaijan
remains doggedly independent and has the potential to be a true leader in the region.
Despite this opportunity, Baku has muddied its rise to international prestige by dedicating
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time, money, and effort to demanding retribution for the Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Azerbaijan sees the conflict as a national humiliation and has pledged to regain its
territory at any cost. As such, it has spent the last twenty years building up its military
infrastructure with single-minded focus. Azerbaijan technically has the legal right to the
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh as the international community and the UN Security
Council have repeatedly upheld its status as the de jure state.161 However, Armenia
remains in possession of the land and until Azerbaijan forcibly pushes out Yerevan’s
troops, the situation will remain unsettled.
Due to vast oil and gas reserves, Azerbaijan has experienced an economic boom
and it currently has a GDP many times larger than its neighbors.162 With its expendable
revenue, Azerbaijan has enlarged its arms cache exponentially. From 2003 to 2011,
Azerbaijan increased military expenses from $135 million to $3 billion and it currently
spends more on its military than Armenia does on its entire federal budget.163 This
increase in military expenditures has also led to a boost in confidence and bellicosity
from Azerbaijan’s leadership. In 2010, President Ilham Aliyev said, “Negotiations [over
Nagorno-Karabakh] will continue whilst we have hope that territorial integrity will be
restored… If we consider this to be impossible, then the state of Azerbaijan… can at any
time restore its territorial integrity through military means.”164
However, Azerbaijan must face the reality that Russia serves as a guarantor of
Armenian and, by default, Karabakhi sovereignty. Tensions have only increased in the
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last decade and “regular military exercises between Armenia and Russia, and on the other
side between Azerbaijan and military partners such as Turkey and Georgia, have also
increased feelings of enmity and mistrust between the two sides.”165 In general, however,
Azerbaijan has eschewed binding military alliances. It does maintain formal relationships
with Turkey and Israel, however, which includes arms sales.166
Armenia has followed a different track. International audiences vilified Armenia’s
policies during the Nagorno-Karabakh War, especially its use of ethnic cleansing, and it
has lobbied heavily in order to restore its reputation, especially with the United States.167
While it currently leans on Russia for support, it also maintains cleverly managed
diplomatic relations with opposing countries despite being effectively boxed in by its
enemies, Azerbaijan and Turkey, on two fronts. However, it suffers from its isolation and
by not having “direct trade or diplomatic links with two of its neighbors.”168 Armenia’s
hope is that time will validate its claim and eventually relations with its neighbors will
normalize.169
As Armenia and Azerbaijan deal with their shared history and issues in
idiosyncratic ways, the ceasefire along the 175-kilometer border between the NagornoKarabakh and Azerbaijan remains tenuous. Some estimates indicate that there are over
20,000 soldiers on each side over the contested border, some within yards of each
other.170 Despite such a heavily militarized perimeter, there are only six international
monitors that ‘watch’ the area, though they need special permission to even get there.
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There are dozens of deaths each year of civilians and military personnel from sniper fire,
mines, etc. and these numbers have risen in recent years.171 There were more border
skirmishes and deaths on the borderlands in 2014 than in any year since 1994. There has
also been an increase in the use of high-caliber weapons, notably when Azerbaijan shot
down an Armenian MI-24 combat helicopter that it claimed had entered Azerbaijani
airspace in November 2014.172
Other countries play a large role in this conflict, perhaps more so than in any other
frozen conflict on the post-Soviet periphery. Turkey is a significant actor and in many
ways it serves as a counter to Iranian involvement. Ankara has close military ties with
Baku but poor relations with Armenia. In fact, the Turkish-Armenia border has been
closed since 1993 in order to show solidarity with Azerbaijan over the NagornoKarabakh War. Turkey and Azerbaijan also share religious and cultural roots. They have
a significant military cooperation and have engaged in numerous military exercises,
including a joint exercise in 2012 with Georgia. In 2010, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a
ten-year “strategic partnership and mutual assistance agreement [in which] if one of the
sides is attacked by a third country, the sides will provide reciprocal aid.”173 Turkey is
also an important customer and transit country for Azerbaijani gas and oil. Though
Turkey has historically been wary of Russia’s presence in the greater Black Sea region,
Moscow holds strong leverage over Ankara, including being their main energy provider.
Turkey may be prevented from coming to Baku’s aid if Russia threatens to cut off power.
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While Iran aided Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh War, it has historically
maintained a contentious relationship with Baku. Though their populations are both
Shiite Muslim, Azerbaijan is a secular country with ties to Israel and the United States. In
the last decade, there have been a number of incidents with foreign agents from both
sides infiltrating the other’s country.174 In 2012, “Iran accused Azerbaijan of harboring
Israeli intelligence agents… That same month, Azerbaijan sentenced seven individuals…
it claimed had been trained in Iran to carry out terrorism, including plans to bomb the
Israeli embassy.”175 Iran maintains much better relations with Armenia. Ultimately, Iran
is not vested in a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, though it does not
support Russian intervention in the region, it would try to prevent Western powers and
Turkey from gaining a stronger foothold in the Caucasus.
Armenia and Azerbaijan’s immediate neighbor to the north is the Republic of
Georgia. After the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia fixed its sights on the West and
away from Russia. However, the 2008 Russo-Georgian War showed the West’s
unwillingness to defend Georgian sovereignty and recent elections brought more proRussian politicians to Tbilisi. This may be dangerous for Azerbaijan as Georgia has been
helpful in providing Baku with alternative routes for its oil and gas pipelines. Azerbaijan
is increasingly worried that Russia may use Georgia as leverage against Baku. However,
Georgia is profiting from the current situation and while it would likely want to see an
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end to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it may not actively engage in promoting peace
unless prompted by the United States or other Western powers.176
Attempts at Reconciliation. Even before the ceasefire was in place after the
Nagorno-Karabakh War, the OSCE formed a committee, later called the Minsk Group,
consisting of Russia, the United States, France, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, in order to find
a peaceful resolution to Nagorno-Karabakh. Over the past twenty years, there have been a
number of meetings and summits. However, no major resolutions have been agreed
upon.177 In February 2010, in response to increased incidents on the border, Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said, “If Russia, the U.S., and France had worked
hard within the past 20 years, none of these problems would have emerged.”178 While the
issue is more complex than that, there is a fundamental lack of urgency about this conflict
that many see as misguided, especially as tensions have risen over the last two years.
Forecast. This conflict will not find a peaceful resolution if left to the main
belligerents. Armenia and Azerbaijan see each other as mortal enemies and local media
and political leaders have done little to quell nationalist sentiment that vilifies the other
side. “Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides perceive possessing Nagorno-Karabakh
as a cornerstone of their national identity.”179 However, the international community has
been unable to resolve the conflict. Russia, the state most suited to mediating a resolution
has instead prolonged the conflict and derailed any true attempts at peacemaking.
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It is evident that this conflict has served to limit growth and stability not only in
the nations and territories involved, but in the greater Black Sea region. It has prevented
integration with Europe at large and has hurt relationships within its neighborhood.
Financially, both Armenia and Azerbaijan are suffering from this frozen conflict.
Azerbaijani oil and gas must take costly routes bypassing Armenia. Consequently,
Armenia is losing millions on transit fees that are now going to Georgia, Iran, and
Turkey. Furthermore, this conflict prevents Armenia from trading with two of its
neighbors and makes it dependent on Russian support and goodwill.180
The current situation is untenable and, if left unchecked, it will ultimately lead to
war. Analysts note that inflammatory rhetoric is at an all-time high. President Aliyev said
in August 2014, “The war is not over. Only the first stage of it is.”181 Clashes over the
summer of 2014 claimed more lives than at any other time since 1994 and Armenia and
Azerbaijan are engaged in an arms race, one that Armenia is increasingly unable to match
without the support of Russia. As Moscow increases its presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan
will feel increasingly trapped and mistrustful of Western allies who they perceive as
having abandoned the Caucasus and Crimea to Russian machinations.182 Azerbaijan is
increasingly the dominant militarily force in the region and is losing hope for a
diplomatic solution. If it sees an opportunity, it may not hesitate to strike. Even if Baku
and Yerevan do not act in a premeditated fashion, the border is heavily militarized and it
may take only a single accident to spark a conflagration.
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Transnistria
Origin. Moldova (Figure 4), a landlocked country that lies between Romania and
Ukraine, has been in a longstanding conflict with the self-proclaimed separatist region of
the Republic of Transnistria since it declared independence on September 2, 1990. While
fighting has largely ceased since a short war in 1992, it remains a potential flashpoint
between the West and Russia.183

Figure 4. Map of Moldova Showing Transnistria (Source: CIA World Factbook)
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Transnistria remains something of an interesting anomaly among the other
conflicts described in this thesis in that the initial motivation for breaking away from its
metropolitan state was not driven by ethnic or religious issues, but was guided by elites.
However, it has metastasized into an ugly, intractable ethnic struggle. While historically
the Dniester River has divided the Slavic world from the rest of Europe, the conflict
between the peoples on either side of its bank was not inevitable prior to 1989, which
makes it different than any other post-Soviet conflict.184
The modern state of Moldova came into existence after the fall of the Soviet
Union. It was historically a contested region between Russia and Romania. In 1918,
Moldova, then called Bessarabia, declared its independence from Russia and united with
Romania. This union lasted until Bessarabia was occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940 as
a result of the German-Soviet Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which divided much of Eastern
Europe.185 At this time, Transnistria, which had been a territory of the Russian Empire
from 1792 to 1924 and Ukraine from 1924 to 1940, was joined, unwillingly, with
Bessarabia. When the territory came under the control of the Romanians from 1941 to
1944, the Transnistrians viewed this as an occupation, and it was a scarring experience
that has resonated throughout its recent history.186
Moscow regained control of the region in 1944 and Bessarabia was formally
annexed in 1947 and renamed the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic.187 During this
time, the Soviets sought to rework the allegiances of the Moldovan people and transform
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the nation into a cohesive body, though once subsumed into the larger Soviet leviathan.
“Soviet propaganda promulgated the idea of a ‘Moldovan people’ with a ‘Moldovan’
language and culture, distinct from the Romanian one.”188 The creation of a distinct
Moldovan political identity was not easy. When the Moldovan Union Republic declared
its independence on August 27, 1991, its last claim to independence had been in the 15th
century.189
When the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic declared itself independent and
claimed the name the Republic of Moldova, it was fundamentally different than the other
newly created post-Soviet states. Moldova is composed of people from various ethnic
groups with a history that the Soviets had attempted to rewrite and impose upon them.
Many Moldovans are of either Romanian or Russian descent, the latter the result of
Russian migration during the Soviet era, and there were no clear indications that the state
would be able to hold itself together.190As such, Soviet occupation was important for
what would later become the state of Moldova in that it provided a shared experience for
the Moldovan people. The lack of centuries of common history and identity were less
important than the shared experience of Romanian occupation and Soviet subjugation.
Interestingly, Soviet attempts to create a cohesive Moldovan state were not
applied to Transnistria, a 400 kilometer strip of land on the “left bank” of the River
Dniester between Moldova and Ukraine.191 According to Natalia Cojocaru in
“Nationalism and Identity in Transnistria,”
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During the Soviet era the opposition between ‘we, the Transnistrian Moldovans’
and ‘they, the Bessarabian Moldovans’ evolved…‘Soviet propaganda had always
implied that Bessarabians are capitalists, indolent people who speak another
language. This ideology was well indoctrinated in the psychology of Transnistrian
people and came to resemble enmity toward the Bessarabian Moldovans.’ The
difference between Transnistrian and Bessarabian Moldovans was emphasized
through unofficial policies of the Communist Party. Transnistria was the area
from which the majority of elites from Soviet Moldova were recruited. The ‘leftbankers’ were considered more loyal to the Soviet regime and more politically
reliable than their counterparts from the former ‘bourgeois’ Bessarabia.192
Though nominally the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic consisted of Bessarabia and
Transnistria, there was a deep divide between these areas. Transnistria had a longer
history of cooperation with the Soviet Union and did not have the Romanian influence
that Bessarabia did, other than four traumatic years spent under Romanian rule during
World War Two. As a result, Transnistria acclimated to Soviet rule much quicker than
the rest of the SSR. It easily Sovietized, shedding its past and working to create a new
identity not tied to Romania. Its people wrote books celebrating non-Romanian
Moldovan culture and history and changed its Latin alphabet to a Cyrillic one.193
According to data from a 1989 referendum, Transnistria had a population of about
555,000. Some 40% were ethnic Moldovans, 28% were Ukrainian, 24% were Russian,
and 8% identified with other groups.194 While Transnistria also boasts an ethnically
diverse population, Russian is the official language and Russia seen as its protector and
savior from Romania. Matthew Rojansky notes in Prospects for Unfreezing Moldova's
Frozen Conflict in Transnistria that
Anecdotal evidence indicates that Russian speakers in Transnistria still generally
think of Romania as the villain and Russia as the hero in a historical narrative
dating back to World War II, when Bucharest was allied with Nazi Germany.
Russian speakers therefore associate modern Romanian nationalism with
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revanchist fascism, a narrative heavily informed by the persistence of a World
War II memory shaped by Soviet ideologists throughout the Slavic core of the
post-Soviet space, and in overt conflict with a neo-nationalist historical narrative
among many of the post-Soviet and post-Communist states in Eastern Europe,
including Romania.195
This divide within the country was not an issue until the late 1980s as Moscow began
losing power among the SSR. During this time, a movement within Moldova, led by a
group called the Moldovan Popular Front, publicly challenged Soviet policies and
attempted to pull Moldova away from the Soviet Union. Initially, they campaigned for a
return to its original language and Latin script. Transnistrians were worried that this rise
in Moldovan nationalism would lead the country towards unification with Romania and
that Transnistria, in turn, would lose its identity and become marginalized.196
While an alphabet may appear to be a minor issue, “the protection and defense of
a nation’s language is such a deeply emotional nationalist cause, for it is language, more
than land and history, that provides the essential form of belonging, which is to be
understood.”197 Chișinău passed a controversial language law in 1989 that “(1) declared
Moldovan the state language of the republic; (2) mandated the transition to the Latin
alphabet; (3) recognized the unity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages; and (4) laid
out a programme for extending its use in government, education, and other related
spheres…”198 It has been argued that this was the final trigger of the frozen conflict that
currently engulfs Moldova.
Moldova’s language law led to increased tensions in the country as Chișinău
sought closer cultural and political ties with Romania. Worried about what this would
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mean, the Transnistrians were proactive and, from 1989 to the fall of the USSR, residents
in Transnistria voted on a number of proposals and referendums seeking to boost local
autonomy against rising nationalism in the rest of Moldova. This included seeking the
rights to disengage with Chișinău politically, thereby freeing the region to join with the
Soviet Union. These plans were stymied when the Soviet Union collapsed. At this time,
there were many discussions within Moldova about the nation’s identity and orientation
and Chișinău had to deal with political, economic, and cultural and language issues
resulting from its newfound independence.
While the conflict between Moldova and Transnistria is said to be one of elite
manipulation, it is clear that elites from both sides made fundamental errors.199 The
Moldovans quickly replaced many of the Russian-leaning Transnistrian political leaders
in the country and threatened economic warfare and the suspension of subsidies to the
region.200 The Moldovan people also made no secret of their desire to shed themselves of
their Soviet past. In response to these actions by Moldova, independent militias within
Transnistria sought to consolidate power in its territory. “Every move in Chișinău that
pulled the republic further away from Moscow was met by a countermove in Transnistria
that drew the region itself further from Chișinău.”201 As explained by Michael Bobick,
this laid the groundwork for the conflict to come as Transnistrians increasingly saw the
move away from
…Soviet (Russophone) norms as ‘Romanianization’, a phenomenon that
threatened non-Romanian speakers with persecution, disenfranchisement, and
death. Violence directed at Russian speakers in Moldovan cities, increasingly
shrill nationalist rhetoric and armed attempts by the Moldovan state to assert its
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sovereignty over Transnistria contributed to a heightened sense of threat
internalized by residents…202
As Chișinău did not assuage these threats, Transnistrians sought to take matters into their
own hands.
Conflict. The war between Moldova and Transnistria, when it came, was short
and decisive, in no small part due to Russian involvement. The fears of political,
economic, and cultural marginalization mobilized much of the Transnistrian population
and a little less than a year before Moldova gained its own independence from the USSR,
Transnistria declared its separation from its de jure state, with the intent to rejoin with
Moscow.
In December 1991, after election of the Transnistria Moldovan Republic’s first
president, Igor Smirnov, paramilitary forces loyal to the new Transnistrian regime
engaged in a wave of low-scale violence against police stations and other authorities that
remained loyal to Chișinău.203 This escalated into a larger military conflict in March
1992. Transnistria was aided by contingents of Russian Cossacks and the Russian 14th
Army, which had been stationed there since 1956.204 This conflict reached its peak at the
town of Bendery in June when Transnistrian forces and “volunteer” Cossacks and
Russian Army members routed Moldovan police that had been sent to restore Moldovan
authority over the town.205
As a result of these decisive victories, a ceasefire was called on July 21, 1992.
Transnistria, with outside help, had managed to consolidate control over most of its
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territory. Around 1,500 people were killed in the conflict and the ceasefire, which was
mediated and enforced by Russia, called for a trilateral peacekeeping operation consisting
of Russian, Moldovan, and Transnistrian forces along the Dniester River.206 As of 2011,
there were over 1,400 Russian forces, formerly of the 14th Army, based in the area.207
These forces also guard a massive Soviet-era arsenal at Kobasna.208
In Transnistria, the conflict is seen to have solidified its place as a sovereign,
independent state. Natalia Cojocaru writes that
In the Transnistrian mass media, the military confrontation of 1992 is presented as
a ‘sacred war against the genocide by nationalistic Moldovans.’ The armed
conflict is still viewed as a valid justification for separatism, and in collective
memory it is ‘a war for truth, justice and independence.’209
This view is as strong now as it was in the early 1990s and such beliefs have made
reconciliation appear futile.
Russia’s Involvement. Russia has played the most significant outside role in this
conflict militarily, economically, and politically and Moscow continues to serve as the
security guarantor of the Transnistria de facto state. “It is also important to remember that
the initial Transnistria ambition was not independence, but to remain with the Soviet
Union; Moscow’s involvement in the dispute was initially to use the separatist movement
to press the leadership in Chișinău...”210
From the outset of the conflict in 1990 to its ceasefire in 1992, Russia played an
important military role and likely played a decisive role in preventing the restoration of
Chișinău’s central authority over Tiraspol. During the conflict, “the 14th Army’s
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commanders allowed the transfer of personnel and weapons from their stockpiles to
robust the separatists’ ranks.” They reportedly “gave the separatists 24 tanks, 12 combat
helicopters, 37,000 machine and submachine guns, as well as 120 cannons…” The 14th
Army also went to battle with the Transnistrian forces against Moldova.211
Furthermore, in the ceasefire brokered by Moscow, Russia installed 6,000
peacekeeping forces within Transnistria.212 Russia currently maintains around 1,500
troops in the region, with less than half serving as peacekeepers. “The idea that Russia is
a protector of Transnistria and its ethnic minorities has become a pillar to justify the
continuous presence of the 14th Army in the de facto state” and the continued presence of
these troops is “a visible symbol of the Republic of Moldova’s ‘limited’ sovereignty.”213
According to Michael Bobick, the presence of Russian troops in Moldova helps to
…thwart Moldova’s European aspirations…European efforts to transform the
peacekeeping mission to an international, civilian mandate have thus far failed.
Far from being a neutral force, Russia occupies the role of aggressor and
peacekeeper, which marginalizes Moldovan attempts to re-assert its sovereignty
over the region.214
This helps Russia maintain a foothold in Europe and allow the perception of strategic
depth. It also serves to physically and psychologically box in Moldova and Ukraine.215
Russian interest in Transnistria also serves an important geopolitical goal. The
Dniester River historically played an important role as a buffer separating the Slavic
world from the rest of Russia. Transnistria seems committed to maintaining that legacy.
“Transdniestrian leaders have publicly stated that they have a historical mission to resist
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Western expansion and they have promised to continue to defend Russia's geopolitical
interests in the heart of the Balkans.”216
Some analysts believe that Moscow’s abiding interest in this territory also comes
from its economic interests. Transnistria could not survive without economic assistance
and trading with Russia. In “Reflections on Negotiation and Mediation: The Frozen
Conflicts and European Security,” William Hill argues that on Russia’s end, its “attitude
on Transnistria is formed and influenced more by the economic and commercial factors
involved in the continued existence of an unrecognized, unregulated entity in southeast
Europe with an economy based heavily on foreign trade.”217
In all, Russian military and economic support is essential for Transnistria. The de
facto state would not have survived the last two and a half decades without Moscow’s
financial and political aid. This includes facilitating travel for Transnistrian citizens. Of a
population of around 550,000, some 100,000 to 140,000 hold Russian passports,
including the majority of Transnistrian state officials.218
Implications. Currently Transnistria operates as a de facto state. It has a tripartite
government; security forces, including an army, police force, and border security; and an
economy with its own currency and tax system.219 However, other than the three de facto
separatist states in the Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, no
nation recognizes Tiraspol, not even Russia.220
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While Transnistria has some industrial capacity, including a steel sector, the
country is largely dependent on aid from Moscow. It struggles with crime and since the
war “it has been generating economic, social, and human rights problems for the
inhabitants of both banks of the Nistru…”221 Moldova itself is one of the poorest
countries in Europe and is severely underdeveloped.222 This is even worse in its
breakaway region. There are few opportunities for honest employment in Transnistria. As
a result, most of the population is involved in illegal trading activities, which take
advantage of Transnistria’s geographical location between Ukraine and Romania.223
“Indeed, due to poorly regulated borders, it is widely believed that Transnistria is a major
node in European and global arms, drugs, and human trafficking networks.”224
Transnistrian officials have been accused by many international organizations of turning
a blind eye to the proliferation of money laundering, smuggling, and weapons trafficking
within its borders.
In Alejandro Sanchez’s article, “The ‘Frozen’ Southeast: How the MoldovaTransnistria Question has Become a European Geo-Security Issue,” he details some of
Transnistria’s most pressing issues including governance by mafia-like elites, prolific
human rights violations, smuggling, racketeering, attacks on the press, human trafficking,
prostitution, and weapons trafficking of everything from missiles, sub-machine guns, and
nuclear materials that have been traced to conflicts in the Balkans, Caucasus, and Africa.
It has been reported that many of the weapons being trafficked through Transnistria are
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currently being produced in factories there as well as being repurposed from old Soviet
stockpiles.225
Attempts at Reconciliation. Since 1997, the OSCE has led “5+2 format” talks.
That is, it has managed a conflict resolution process with seven nations, including
Moldova, Transnistria, Russia, and Ukraine. The United States and EU serve as
observers. While these talks have worked to quell some crises, they have not resulted in
any meaningful framework towards conflict resolution.226 Transnistria continues to reject
any calls to rejoin Moldova and oppose the expansion of peace talks.227
As in the case of many of the frozen conflicts discussed in this thesis, it has been
over twenty-five years since these territories have existed as a cohesive unit. Many
citizens have no memory of Moldova and Transnistria existing as a single state. This will
be difficult to overcome.228 Moldovans mistrust Transnistrians and view them as
entrenched Russophiles. They worry that Transnistrians do not share European values
and would derail attempts by Chișinău to further partner with the West.229
Transnistrians, having existed in its own de facto state for decades, are largely
content, even in their poverty, and feel secure with Russia as their guarantor of
sovereignty. They feel deep mistrust towards Moldova and “being brought up and
educated in the environment created by the very specific propagandist machine of
Tiraspol, inhabitants of the left bank gradually developed a belief… that they constitute a
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‘people’, a separate ‘nation’ endowed with a right to the external self-determination…”230
It is unlikely that they will ever willingly seek to rejoin Moldova. The question of
Transnistria joining a greater state usually revolves less around their rejoining with
Moldova as it does their annexation to Russia. Transnistria consistently calls for
absorption within the Russian Federation, though Moscow does not appear to be enthused
by the idea. Transnistria’s “drawbacks are related to its territorial discontinuity with the
Russian Federation… landlocked position and awkward configuration of its narrow strip
of land on the left bank of the Dniester River.”231 It also provides few political benefits
for Russia. Recent calls for annexation by Tiraspol have been exacerbated since the
Crimea conflict annexation and it often cites an internationally unrecognized referendum
held on the issue in 2006 where Transnistrians voted overwhelmingly to rejoin Russia.
Some 97% voted in favor of future integration into Russia.232
While Russia has not leapt at this offer, it is clear that they would have powerful
leverage if they wanted to resolve this frozen conflict, especially as the international
community has placed little effort in finding a solution to this issue. “Lacking
international recognition [Transnistria and other de facto states will continue]… as
havens for smuggling, corruption and trafficking in everything from drugs to people.”233
Though this conflict is frozen, like others in the region it has the potential to spiral
quickly, though it would take a major incident resulting from these conflicts to actually
galvanize the international community to push Chișinău and Tiraspol towards
reconciliation.
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Forecast. There are few signs that this conflict will be resolved with any
expediency. At the same time, it is unlikely that fighting will break out again. “Chișinău
understands, particularly due to the 2008 summer war in Georgia, that Moscow will
actively support Transnistria, as it did in 1992, and little aid can be expected from
NATO.” 234 Though Moscow is increasing its presence in the Transnistria and conducts
military exercises regularly, there is little sense of urgency within the region.235
While the Transnistrian economy is stunted and they remain dependent on
Russian economic support for its survival, Moldova is doing almost as poorly. From
Tiraspol’s perspective, there seem to be few compelling reasons to consider rejoining
Moldova. In referendums, Transnistria has consistently voted to maintain its
independence from Moldova, while indicating its desire to join Russia. While Moscow
does not want Transnistria to rejoin with Moldova, it has not indicated that it would like
for the region to join the Russian Federation.236 However, with recent events in Crimea,
threats of annexation may carry more weight than at any time in the previous decades.

Crimea
Origin. On its surface, the frozen conflict in Crimea bears many similarities to
others in the post-Soviet space. Each emerged after a shared history of centuries of
Ottoman rule followed by over two centuries under Russian imperial and communist
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control, resulting in serious internal ethnic and cultural issues.237 In Crimea, the problems
preceding the 2014 conflict had been festering for some time. However, the situation as a
whole does not fit neatly into the paradigm of the other frozen conflicts discussed in this
thesis. Furthermore, Russian involvement in this secessionist movement was a clear
deviation from its involvement in previous conflicts and the result, an annexation of
sovereign Ukrainian territory to Russia, may represent a new model for Russian policy in
its near abroad.
Crimea (Figure 5), a territory of some 26,200 square kilometers, has existed as an
independent state for less than four decades of its history. It has otherwise been ruled by a
series of hegemons, including: “…the Greeks, Bulgars, Scythians, Romans, Gots, Huns,
Khazars, Kievan Rus, the Byzantine Empire, Venice, Genoa, Kipchaks, the Mongol
Golden Horde, Ottoman Empire, Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, Soviet Union, Germany,
Soviet Union again and Ukraine...”238 It became a colony of the Russian Empire in 1787
after Russia wrested the territory from the Ottoman Empire in a series of conflicts. At the
time, the peninsula was called the Taurida Governorate. In the centuries since, Crimea
has undergone a dramatic demographic, cultural, economic, and political transformation.
The territory was once home to a large population of Muslim Tatars and Turks who were
forcibly removed from the region or killed after the Russian Empire took over. What
followed in the 19th century was a policy of forced Russification of the remaining
population through compulsory schooling, military service, and conversion to Orthodox
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Christianity. There was also a massive resettlement of ethnic Russians to the area starting
in 1783, which displaced many of the indigenous inhabitants.239

Figure 5. Map of Ukraine Showing the Crimean Peninsula (Source: CIA World
Factbook)

After the collapse of the Russian Empire and the rise of the Soviet Union, Crimea
underwent further changes. In 1917, the Taurida Governorate was split, with much of the
peninsula, less the port city of Sevastopol, which hosted the main naval base of the
Russian Republic’s Black Sea Fleet, forming the Crimean People’s Republic. The rest of
the governorate joined the Ukrainian People’s Republic. In October 1921, after the Soviet
Union regained much of its control over former holdings, Crimea was given the name the
Crimean ASSR and it became a subunit of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic. Crimea was incorporated into the Soviet Union only a year later and remained
as part of the USSR with the exception of three years of occupation by the Third Reich
239
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from 1941 to 1944. After World War Two, Crimea was stripped of its autonomous status
and became a simple oblast or state of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic.240
This lasted until 1954 when control of the Crimean Oblast was transferred to the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a symbolic gesture marking the 300th anniversary
of “Russo-Ukrainian reunification.”241 Sevastopol continued to be directly administered
by Moscow as it controlled the fate of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet.242 Propaganda aside,
this transfer was likely completed in order to provide a large labor force to Ukraine.
However, it clearly violated Articles 14 and 18 of the Soviet constitution, which required
consent between Soviet Socialist Republics before any changes were made to their
borders. “Therefore, even in Soviet terms the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was illegal,
unconstitutional and clearly illegitimate.” 243
Crimea was subject to further upheaval during the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. During this time, Ukraine voted to maintain Crimea as an autonomous republic
within Ukraine. However, this was done without the consent of the people of Crimea,
many of who wanted to rejoin with Russia. In reaction, in February 1992, the Crimean
ASSR changed its name to the Republic of Crimea without Ukraine’s consent and in May
1992, the Crimean parliament declared the state’s independence and passed its first
constitution. It was later amended at Kiev’s insistence to specify that Crimea was part of
Ukraine and very quickly afterwards Crimean independence was voted null and void by
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the Ukrainian parliament.244
The issue over Crimea’s ownership was, and remains, a surprisingly sensitive one
for Russians within the new Russian Federation.
Indeed, the Crimea was the only territory outside of the perimeter of the new
borders of the Russian Federation about which most Russians, irrespective of their
political orientation, felt strongly….[However,] in 1991, Yeltsin chose not to
insist on the restoration of the peninsula to Russia, in exchange for Ukraine’s
renunciation of its portion of the Soviet nuclear arsenal deployed on its
territory.245
This was a strategic decision by Moscow, emotions notwithstanding. At face value,
Ukraine could potentially become a threat. As the Soviet empire faced collapse in
Moscow, Kiev appeared poised for resurgence, despite institutional and economic issues.
Ukraine [was] the largest new state to be created in Europe [in the 20th century];
52 million people in a territory the size of France, a nation with an army of
600,000 men; the legatee of an imperial arsenal that [made] it the third nuclear
power in the world; the sixth largest naval power by virtue of its claim to part of
the Black Sea fleet moored in Sevastopol; a nation of enormous natural wealth
ranging from the coal and steel of the Donetsk basin to the agricultural abundance
of the black-soil lands.246
At the time, it seemed prudent for Moscow to relinquish Crimea to Ukraine instead of
raising tensions with its former satellite.
Russia again agreed to uphold Ukraine and Crimea’s post-Soviet borders when it
signed a treaty with Ukraine in 1997 recognizing the boundaries that existed at the time
of the breakup of the Soviet Union, thereby legally conferring and confirming Crimea’s
status as belonging within Ukraine.247 However, this still did not solve the problems
between Moscow and Kiev over the peninsula. Some of the many issues between these
states specifically dealing with Crimea included “the division of the Soviet Black Sea
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Fleet between the two states, the basing rights of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in
Sevastopol, the Russian use of military facilities in Crimea, [and] the number and status
of Russian military personnel in Ukrainian territory.”248 Furthermore, Kiev alleged that
since 1991 Moscow had “covertly supported and controlled the actions of Russian
separatists in Crimea and also maintained a sizeable contingent of its own civilian (FSB)
and military intelligence (GRU) agents.”249
For its part, the newly sovereign Ukraine faced many domestic problems in the
early 1990s. At the fall of the USSR, Ukraine appeared to have the requisite requirements
for successful statehood. However, it had been a part of Russia for centuries and had not
existed as an independent entity since the 15th and 18th centuries. Kiev needed to find a
way to hold its state together. Momentum was on its side initially as rising nationalism
that had emerged as a result of Soviet policies of glasnost and perestroika helped make
the case that “there always was a Ukrainian nation; that it had been suppressed for
centuries; that it has at last found its freedom...” However, Moscow “was not wrong
when it dismissed nationalist feeling here as weak, marginal, and easily suppressed.”250
There was no consensus in Ukraine on how to proceed and define its new state.
Furthermore, conflicting demographic elements would make achieving consent difficult.
In the Russified east, Soviet rule was popularly supported, whereas in the West,
the Soviets were seen as occupiers. As noted by Anton Bebler, during the late 1980s,
Western Ukraine was convulsed with student demonstrations, strikes, and
religious processions. The mistake that cost Gorbachev his empire was to believe
a new Soviet man had been created here. He was to discover how bitter, enduring,
and unforgiving national memory can be… As in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
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Hungary, nationalism and national revival here mean returning to Europe… Being
a European here means not being Russian.251
Such fundamental differences in perspective between east and west Ukraine were
significant and did not lessen over the next decade. In the east, and especially in Crimea,
demographics are not in Kiev’s favor. The 2001 Ukrainian census found that Crimea’s
population consisted of 58% ethnic Russians, 24% Ukrainians, and 12% Crimean Tatars.
Much of the ethnic Russian population was resistant to assimilation with the larger
Ukrainian state. Over the last twenty-five years, and especially since 2014, there has been
an increase in the number of Russians moving to the peninsula and an exodus of ethnic
Ukrainians and Tatars from Crimea.252
The pro-democratic Orange Revolution in 2004 and 2005 further worsened ties
between Ukraine and Moscow. Russia was afraid that this revolution would herald
Ukraine’s eventual membership into NATO, a red line for Moscow. It believed that
Ukraine lay within its historical sphere of influence and that the West’s incursion into this
space presented an existential threat. “Since the mid-1990s, Russians have come to accept
Ukraine as a separate state, but they still did not exactly consider it a foreign one. In the
elite and to some extent also popular mind, Kiev remained ‘the mother of Russian cities.’
NATO accession would turn this part of Russian national patrimony into a Western
bulwark against Russia.”253 Moscow believed Ukraine would turn against Russia,
creating a divide between the countries on everything from religion to trade. Furthermore,
Moscow worried that it would have to deploy troops to its border, cut defense industrial
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links with Kiev, and move its fleet in the Black Sea to make room for the U.S. Navy.254
Based on recent events, it seems likely that “Russian contingency plans for the
annexation of Crimea were probably prepared and regularly updated for at least two
decades.”255 Furthermore, the decision to annex Crimea, as will be described in the next
section, was likely decided as far back as 2008 when the NATO summit in Bucharest
opened the possibility of Ukrainian and Georgian membership. However, immediate
invasion plans were postponed temporarily after the pro-Russian politician Victor
Yanukovich became the President of Ukraine.256
Conflict. The military, economic, and political issues between Ukraine and both
Crimea and Russia smoldered for over two and a half decades. The ethnic-Russian
Crimean population had been restive since the early 1990s and resisted assimilation with
Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia maintained a military presence within Sevastopol and
…the presence of Russian Armed Forces on the territory of a legally independent
successor state offered not only psychological comfort but also, when needed or
feared, physical protection for separatists [in Crimea]. This protection allowed
them to carry out illegal referenda [in 2014], to proclaim and subsequently defend
the secession.257
In February 2014, a series of protests broke out in Ukraine against the ruling
regime in what would be called the Euromaidan Revolution. On February 22, 2014,
following the deaths of dozens of protesters, President Yanukovych was overthrown and
he, along with a group of high-level Ukrainian officials with close ties to Moscow, fled to
Russia. During the power vacuum before the interim government could restore order,
Moscow carried out its operation to annex Crimea. The speed, success, and covert nature
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of this operation clearly indicate that these plans had been set for some time.258
On February 26, 2014, clashes orchestrated by Moscow pitted pro-Russian and
pro-Ukrainians protesters against each other near parliament in Crimea’s capital
Simferopol. The pro-Russian protesters blockaded the parliament building, which was
later occupied by pro-Russian gunmen, and demanded secession from Ukraine. They also
pleaded for intervention from Moscow. The next day, armed and masked individuals,
ostensibly agents from Moscow, seized and barred entrance to government buildings
throughout Crimea. During an emergency session of the Supreme Council of Crimea,
which was held under armed guard, Sergey Aksyonov of the Party of Russian Unity, an
ethnic Russian from Moldova, was appointed the new Prime Minister of Crimea. The
council also voted to terminate the Crimean government and hold a referendum on the
status of the peninsula.259
By February 28, 2014, deputies of the Russian State Duma submitted an
amendment to the constitution on admitting new territories to the Russian Federation.
“The draft specifically justified the incorporation of parts of Ukraine into the Russian
Federation on the grounds of alleged Ukrainian discrimination against national
minorities.”260 That same day, in Crimea, “local self-defense” militias, assisted by “little
green men” who later turned out to be Russian forces,
…seized the strategically important Perekop Istmus, blocked or cut off all land,
sea and air connections of Crimea with the rest of Ukraine, took over all Crimean
ports and airports, radio and TV stations, blocked and occupied all installations of
the Ukrainian Army and Navy, and illegally expropriated practically all their
stocks of arms and ammunition.261
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Their actions “diminished Ukraine’s ability to exert control and maintain order. Existing
Russian military and naval installations in Crimea led to confusion as to whether these
‘little green men’ were legally allowed to be there according to the terms of a 2010
basing agreement.”262
The conflict was a testament to the Russian ability to conduct hybrid warfare, the
combining of traditional means of military power with other types of non-military power.
Russia commanded fewer than 10,000 assault troops and an unknown number of masked
“little green men.” The latter are a mix “of regular infantry and anti-terrorist police units
with a secret chain of command…bearing no insignia or visible ranks on their combat
fatigues.”263 Their loyalty is intended to be ambiguous and, during the early hours and
days of conflict, conceal the state identity of the invading force to prevent easy
attribution.
The success of Russia’s three-week operation was due to three main factors, as
enumerated by Anton Bebler in “The Russian-Ukrainian Conflict over Crimea.” Russia
was able to draw on its marines that were legally stationed in Sevastopol and who could
be used for reconnaissance and other missions prior to the conflict without raising
suspicion. Furthermore, all of Crimea’s important strategic assets were located in close
proximity, especially its main airport. This allowed for the “quick insertion of airtransported troops and speedy acquisition of targets.”264 Last, according to Bebler,
Ukraine’s military, for lack of information, training, or loyalty, did not effectively defend
Crimea. Anton Bebler writes that
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…the Ukrainian military personnel stationed in Crimea were not given orders to
resist and thus all 190 military installations and most weapons were surrendered
to the invaders. About 20,000 Ukrainian military personnel capitulated without a
shot being fired. Moreover, most of them switched their loyalty and opted to
remain in Crimea. Most of the Ukrainian Navy was also captured by the Russian
military without resistance. The Ukrainian commanding officers did not try to sail
off with their ships and crews in order to reach mainland Ukrainian ports. Only
several serviceable aircraft of the Ukrainian Navy escaped the capture. The
Crimean police either failed to act or cooperated with the Russian Special Forces
and Crimean separatists.265
However, “although the Russian Armed Forces de facto occupied Crimea, they did not
establish a military occupation regime.”266 It seems likely that at the time Moscow was
still deciding whether to annex the territory completely or to allow it to perpetuate as a de
facto state.
Russia’s Involvement. The extent of Russia’s support to separatists in Crimea
and its annexation of the peninsula signifies a dramatic departure from how it previously
dealt with secessionist movements in its periphery. However, there were many who
predicted such action. In 1993, Michael Ignatieff, in his book Blood and Belonging:
Journeys into the New Nationalism, presciently wrote:
The Crimea is the most contested ground in Ukraine. If Russians are ever likely to
fight Ukrainians, it might be here. Ethnic Russians outnumber Ukrainians in the
peninsula; all are stridently aware that the Crimea was ceded by Stalin’s
successors to Ukraine only in 1954. There are Russian separatists here… who
want to break away from Ukraine and seek to restore the Crimea’s status as an
autonomous republic, which it enjoyed before the Second World War.267
Since the fall of the USSR, Russia had opposed Ukraine’s greater integration with the
West and its aspirations for NATO membership. After the Crimea conflict, Russia made
it clear that its motivations were purely geopolitical. NATO’s spread “‘directly in front of
the Russian house,’ ‘on Russia’s historic territories’ remains to President Putin and to the
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Russian elite utterly unacceptable.”268 Ukraine has been a vital territory to Moscow and
“Crimea is psychologically much closer to the hearts of many Russians and particularly
of the Russian military than any of the four other ex-Soviet territories.”269
In 2006, Russia made clear its interests in regards to Crimea. Putin said that “The
Crimea forms part of the Ukrainian side and we cannot interfere in another country’s
internal affairs. At the same time, however, Russia cannot be indifferent to what happens
in the Ukraine and Crimea.”270 The Russian pretexts for its dramatic intervention in this
conflict are similar to its claims in other frozen conflicts on its periphery. Michael Bobick
argues that the Crimea example followed the same template as almost every other postSoviet intervention in which
…a sudden power shift to a ‘nationalist’ government alienated those who see
themselves as ethnically or linguistically outside of the nation. This perceived
threat, coupled with Russian military backing, creates the conditions for the
emergence of a hitherto non-existing nation. Next, constituent holders of
sovereignty are called forth through the most democratic of all processes, the
referendum. Finally, Russia stabilizes the situation with a one-sided peace
agreement (Transnistria), annexation (Crimea), or international recognition
(Abkhazia and South Ossetia).271
Russian involvement in this conflict serves a number of purposes. First, it helps
protect its military assets in Crimea. Second, it halts in its tracks any NATO expansion
that includes Ukraine. It also shows Russian groups abroad that Moscow can be depended
upon. This is sharply juxtaposed with the West’s failure to answer Georgia’s call for aid
in the 2008 war and Ukraine’s plea for help in 2014. Russia’s involvement also renews
hope among other Russian secessionist movements and among de facto states in the
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greater Black Sea region. Furthermore, it reinvigorates Russia’s place as the power
broker in the region and reasserts its hegemony along its periphery and self-claimed
sphere of influence. Any resolution to this or the other frozen conflicts in the region will
need to go through Russia. Finally, it puts the rest of Eastern Europe and the United
States on notice. This conflict was a highly planned covert operation that was executed
near-flawlessly. It provides a tacit threat to other states along Russia’s northwestern
border, especially Poland and the Baltic states, and shows Russia’s willingness to use
kinetic force to achieve its goals. And, for the first time in decades, Moscow’s goals may
include the forcible redrawing of international borders.
Implications. The Crimea situation is unique in post-Cold War Europe. It has
stoked concerns over a revanchist, neo-imperialist Russia. While Moscow’s actions can
be understood as preemptive, in order to forestall NATO expansion on its borders, it can
also be seen as a “renunciation of the balance of power in the Euro-Atlantic area formed
after the end of the Cold War and as a demand for a redefinition of legitimate ‘zones of
interest’ in Europe. It could be also taken as a stern warning to other ex-Soviet republics
to behave.”272
In order to legitimize the Crimean annexation, a ‘people’ needed to be created that
could then call for sovereignty and the right to self-determination. This narrative was
important to justify annexation. “An occupation had to be staged on humanitarian
grounds – who or what these forces were protecting and from what remained unclear –
and self-determination occurred under the watchful eye of masked men with guns…”273
However, a referendum was called for on March 16, 2014. Importantly, there was no time
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allowed before the referendum for debate over the issues facing Crimean citizens. After
February 28th, 2014, Russian security personnel had blocked off land and air access to
Ukraine and had taken over or shut down all television and printed media. During this
time, Crimea was subject to persistent disinformation. “The intense propaganda
campaign, almost like that seen during the Cold War, depicted the interim Ukrainian
authorities in Kiev as ‘fascists’ or ‘neo-Nazis’ who had presumably threatened the
Russian and Russian-speaking population with ‘genocide.’”274 Furthermore, the
referendum did not include the options to stay as part of Ukraine or to declare Crimea’s
independent statehood.
Reportedly, over 81% of the population voted. Of these, 97% voted to separate
from Ukraine and integrate with Russia.275 Ukraine and some ethnic groups within
Crimea, including the Crimean Tatars, reject these results. However, even though it is
likely that the results of the referendum were inflated to legitimize Crimea’s annexation
into the Russian Federation, much of the Russian-speaking minority in Crimea
overwhelmingly supported it.276
On March 21st, 2014, the “Constitutional Law on admitting to the Russian
Federation the Republic of Crimea and Establishing within the Russian Federation the
New Constituent Entities the Republic of Crimea and the City of Federal Importance
Sevastopol” was passed in the Russian Federal Assembly and signed by President Putin.
Crimea and Sevastopol were officially accepted as new units of the Russian
Federation.277
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The resolution of the initial stages of this conflict and integration of Crimea into
the Russian Federation was seen as a paradigm-shifting event. Russia has had few qualms
in supporting separatist movements on its periphery. Indeed, “it has become clear that
while Russia will deal with any secession within its borders in the harshest manner (i.e.
Chechnya), it has no problem supporting secessionist movements abroad… if these
groups are pro-Moscow.”278 However, it had never taken the steps to integrate these de
facto states into the Russian Federation before, despite Transnistria repeatedly asking and
voting for the privilege of doing so. Other separatists in the region as well as the
international community believed that this represents a change in how Moscow deals
with the nations and conflicts on its periphery. However, though this success seems to
have given Moscow a confidence-boost and allowed it to be more active in the region and
world, notably Syria, there have not been other moves to resolve conflicts on its
periphery or further integrate any more territory with the Russian Federation.
Since 2014, nations and de facto states have interpreted Moscow’s actions in
different ways. Tbilisi had been a strong ally to Ukraine since the fall of the Soviet Union
and Georgia perceives the Ukrainian crisis “as a microcosm of the bigger geopolitical
standoff between Russia and the West, rather than as a sui generis crisis that arose out of
various domestic political developments.”279 It is worried that Georgian territory will be
next on Moscow’s agenda and it has renewed its drives to become more integrated with
the EU and NATO. However, though South Ossetia and Abkhazia seek stronger ties with
Moscow, it is unlikely that they would be absorbed into the greater Russian Federation,
according to Sergey Markedonov and Maxim A. Suchkov.
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Though the worry that Moscow will incorporate the breakaway regions into its
territory is certainly not farfetched, it is based on the assumption that it is now the
Kremlin’s strategy to multiply ‘Crimean precedents’ all across the post-Soviet
space. The reality, however, is that Moscow has shown little appetite to extend the
precedent to the Caucasus…280
Though it has signed new treaties with these territories, Moscow repeatedly rebuffs calls
to change the status of these regions’ borders and incorporate them into the federation.
Azerbaijan has been wary since the Crimean conflict, fearing intervention in
Nagorno-Karabakh on Armenia’s behalf. Yerevan looked upon Moscow’s actions in
Crimea favorably and it has pushed closer to Russia since the annexation in hopes that
Moscow will provide further support to its claims in Nagorno-Karabakh. “There is
growing sentiment across the political spectrum that the ‘re-incorporation of Crimea into
Russia’ justifies Yerevan’s striving to win back ‘Armenia’s historical lands’ in NagornoKarabakh.”281 As such, since the spring of 2014, that conflict has heated up. The
summers of 2014, 2015, and 2016 saw the most ceasefire violations since the conflict
reached an armistice in 1994.
However, in The Caucasus after Ukraine, Sergey Markedonov and Maxim A.
Suchkov claim that there is little to be gained from further annexations, calling into
question the idea that Crimea represents a major policy shift for Moscow in regards to
separatist movements.
The truth of the matter is that Russia has little additional leverage to gain from
outright annexation, and in fact would be only multiplying its liabilities, both
economic and in the security realm, should these wayward territories be joined to
it. And therein lies a potentially serious trap for Moscow. If the Russian-backed
regions present the Kremlin with a direct plea for annexation, it will face an
unpleasant choice: either disappoint its clients or further antagonize the West,
cementing its reputation as a pariah state for more than a generation to come…
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Nevertheless, none of this means that Russia will foreswear annexation
eventually…282
At this time, Moscow does not seem likely to apply the Crimea precedent to other
conflicts. However, it does show that Moscow takes its role as hegemon and protector of
foreign-born ethnic Russians seriously and it may not hesitate to act militarily if another
such situation arises.
Attempts at Reconciliation. The Crimean conflict is ongoing, though little has
been done to reverse Russian gains. There are also issues with other separatist regions
within Ukraine, including Donbass. The diplomatic situation there seems dire. On
September 1, 2014, the OSCE arranged for a ceasefire. The resultant Minsk Protocol was
signed by Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR), and the
Lugansk People's Republic (LPR) and a follow-up was agreed to on September 19, 2014,
which banned offensive operations, halted flights by combat aircraft over the region, and
arranged for OSCE mediation. It was never effectively put into place and completely
collapsed by January 2015. Another attempt at a ceasefire, Minsk II, was signed in
February 2015 but it has also been largely ineffective.283
Moscow cancelled a meeting during the G20 Summit in September 2016 to
discuss the Minsk ceasefire. Since then, there has been a steady increase in violence
between separatist and Ukrainian forces. Russia has taken the opportunity to blame Kiev
for its inability to maintain a lasting ceasefire and is using this crisis to deepen the divide
between Ukraine and the West. In August 2016, Putin accused Ukraine of plotting
terrorist attacks and said, “I think it is clear now that today’s Kiev government is not
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looking for ways to solve problems by negotiations, but is resorting to terror.”284 Michael
Kofman writes that while
…the separatists have not abided by the terms of the ceasefire, Europeans have
been pushing Ukraine to fulfill its side of the bargain for over a year now without
much success. Russia is banking on the fact that U.S. and European leaders have
no alternative plan for freezing this conflict, and will further lean on Kyiv to start
giving Moscow what it wants rather than see the Minsk framework publicly
unravel.285
As this plays out, Kiev is losing support internationally as many of the powers that could
make an impact, namely the United States, are more focused on conflicts elsewhere and
do not wish to actively confront Russia.
Forecast. Since 2014, the political and legal impasse between Ukraine and Russia
over the status of Crimea has created a new frozen conflict in the greater Black Sea
region. While the self-proclaimed Republic of Crimea adopted a new constitution in
April 2014 and a formal annexation was approved by Russia in March 2014, the
international community still recognizes Crimea as belonging to Ukraine. The Ukrainian
parliament has repeatedly reaffirmed that Crimea is its territory. However, there seems to
be little that it can do to enforce its claim. Ukraine has closed its borders with Crimea and
cut off all rail and road connections. Russian Prime Minister Medvedev declared that the
present status of Crimea was a non-negotiable “closed chapter.” This conflict is likely not
over but it raises the specter and fear of a more militarily adventurous and less cautious
Russia both in Ukraine and elsewhere in the region.286
President Putin’s actions in Ukraine have upended the post-Cold War European
order. In the 25 years since the dissolution of the USSR, Europe sought deeper political
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and economic ties, as evidenced by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which created the
European Union and a single European currency, the euro. The post-war European
paradigm also included the belief that borders would be maintained, with few notable
exceptions, even as borders themselves seemed to lose relevance among the many nations
in Europe who are part of the Schengen Agreement. However, the idealism, and perhaps
naiveté, of post-Cold War Western leaders has been checked, and Russian actions along
its periphery have increased tensions with its neighbors and the United States. While
more actions to forcibly rewrite borders, as Russia has done with Crimea, do not seem
imminent, they are no longer outside the realm of possibility.
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CONCLUSION

Stasis
The conflicts over Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, and
Crimea have reached points of uneasy equilibrium. “Unrecognized by the international
community, prey to organized crime, mired in economic misery, scoured by ethnic
cleansing, and seared by recent memories of war, these hard-pressed territories have
clung to their independence, ever fearful that the states from which they seceded will
reabsorb them.”287 While the metropolitan states of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and
Ukraine are too weak politically, economically, and militarily to retake their breakaway
states, they have not given up hopes of doing so. The underlying issues of these conflicts
have not been resolved and without oversight by the international community, they are
likely to become a strategic liability for states both within and outside the region.
The conflicts discussed in this thesis have many similarities. Each de facto state
shares a history of centuries of Ottoman rule followed by over two centuries under
Russian imperial and communist rule, resulting in profound ethnic and cultural
problems.288 During much of the Soviet era, these territories, composed of ethnic
minorities distinct from their metropolitan states, were neither allowed freedom of
cultural and ethnic expression, nor were they forced to assimilate with the culture of the
state to which they were attached. At the same time, they were allowed regional and
ethnic administrative systems that supported the growth and development of nationalist
secessionist movements that rose to prominence in the 1980s during the waning years of
287
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the Soviet Union.
Except for the most recent conflicts in South Ossetia and Crimea, all the other
frozen conflicts in this thesis have been held by ceasefires since the early 1990s that
“enshrine[d] the victory of separatist forces on the battlefield…”289 Most de facto states
are host to Russian peacekeeping forces and despite being monitored by international
organizations, little progress has been made in over two decades of negotiations.
“Separatist entities have used [this time] to pursue state-building projects, reflected in the
creation of an array of institutions and the development of a discourse of statehood and
sovereignty among their elites and populations.”290
They have also tried to find different justifications to appeal to states for greater
international recognition. If the right to self-determination based on ethnic identification
were not enough, these territories have also claimed rights to independence based on
historical and moral reasons. In “appealing to history, the de facto states claim that their
current incarnation represents but the latest phase in a long tradition of statehood.”291
Transnistria claims historical statehood from when it was an autonomous region in
Ukraine before the Second World War whereas Armenia claims that Nagorno-Karabakh
had autonomy under Persian rule. This appeal to historical precedent is useful; it helps
justify past and present struggles and violence in order to establish claims for the future.
Furthermore, “[a]ll the separatist authorities insist on an inherent moral
entitlement to self-determination when faced with ‘alien’ and ‘imposed’ rule.”292 Some
have attempted to claim statehood following the precedent set by Israel after World War
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Two. They feel a sense of entitlement after having suffered genocide at the hands of their
metropolitan states.
However, despite fulfilling most requirements for statehood, these territories have
been relegated to a condition of legal ambiguity with little hope for recourse in
international law.293 At some point during most of these conflicts, “the separatists
appealed to and begged the Russian Federation to be admitted into it. So far, only Crimea
has become legally (and to a lesser extent, substantively) an exception. Unlike… other
cases, it was promptly admitted and became reunited with the Russian Federation.”294
However, these pseudo-states “are playing the long game, in which not losing means
winning.”295
Metropolitan states have firmly placed blame at these conflicts’ non-resolution
with Moscow. According to Dov Lynch,
Vasily Sturza, then the Moldovan presidential envoy to the negotiations with the
PMR, made the point bluntly in July 2000: ‘The resolution of the conflict depends
exclusively on the Russian Federation. Transnistria is an unrecognized state
invented from nothing, invented by Russia. Without Russian political and
economic support, this invention would not have been possible.’
Similarly, an Abkhaz parliamentarian-in-exile in Tbilisi characterized all the post-Soviet
conflicts not as civil wars but as “military-political conflicts between these new states and
Russia.”296 Moscow has served an indispensible role in both aiding these separatist
movements at their nascence and “ambiguity in Russian policy has done nothing to help
resolve them since. The ‘Russia factor’ permeates these conflicts, with Moscow involved
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at all levels and in myriad ways.”297 The concerted efforts to distribute Russian passports
and claim citizens in these territories has further complicated these conflicts and given
Moscow legal recourse in intervening in these areas, allowing for the “presence of
Russian Armed Forces on the territory of a legally independent successor…”298
There does not appear to be much momentum towards changing the status quo in
any of these conflicts, especially as many internal drivers help in perpetuating these de
facto states. The leadership within these territories insist on preserving absolute
sovereignty. They maintain that their states fulfill all necessary requirements for
statehood as laid out in the Montevideo Convention of 1933. The Abkhazian president,
Vladislav Ardzinba, said in 1999 “Statehood doesn’t need to be recognized by the
international community. It is sufficient if it is declared by the people themselves.”299
Each of the de facto states discussed in this thesis maintains “a system of
organized political leadership with popular support and that provides basic governmental
services to a given population over a specific territory over which effective control is
maintained over a significant period of time.”300 While this is empirically true, the level
of services provided by the central authority in each de facto state varies. Abkhazia
maintains the daily running of three branches of government but is unable to provide
social services to its population and depends on the support of the UN and NGOs. In fact,
the amount of money brought in from international humanitarian aid organizations far
exceeds Abkhazia’s total government budget. Furthermore, while the central authority
maintains security services to defend its sovereignty, it is unable to ensure law and order
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across its territory, especially in the Gali district. There are also competing security
forces, including Russian troops, Georgian paramilitary groups, and armed ethnic
minority groups that roam largely unchecked.301
Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria, conversely, have much stronger central
authorities. These territories have rebuilt some of their infrastructure since their conflicts
in the early 1990s and the central security forces maintain effective control within the
state and along its borders. That is not to say they are without problems. They also suffer
from a total “collapse of industrial production, widespread… unemployment, and the
deep impoverishment of their populations.”302 Despite their issues, each of these de facto
states claim that their situations would improve if they were given the chance to operate
as equal members of the international community.303 These territories are well aware that
that their frozen conflicts are not over. War could conceivably resume at any moment.
The de facto states perceive peace as a temporary thing and they know that while they are
working just to survive, the metropolitan states are surpassing them militarily and
economically.304
The Abkhazian defense minister once remarked “‘The whole world helps the
Georgian armed forces… Who is Georgia preparing to fight? Against Russia? No.
Against Turkey? No. They are preparing to fight Abkhazia. All of the preparations are
designed against Abkhazia.”305 In response, de facto states continue to prepare new
generations for conflict. Universal male conscription is the rule rather than the exception.
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It helps to socialize, integrate, and assimilate young men into the state’s culture. The
persistence of a sense of existential threat has distorted the relationship between the civil
and military aspects of government. Security services and the military largely dominate
the political processes of these states, hurting economic and social development.
Furthermore, the persistence of these conflicts has poisoned these populations against the
international order and rule of law. Power and blunt force are seen as the only way to
deter and to ensure survival. There is a marked distrust of the international community
and of peacekeeping and reconciliation efforts, which hinders the resolution of these
conflicts.306
Another internal driver to the continuation of these conflicts is that these de facto
states suffer from subsistence syndromes. They are all essentially failing or failed states
that are able to maintain institutional fixtures of statehood but cannot provide basic
services for their citizens. These territories are still trying to recover from the collapse of
the Soviet system and the destruction of their infrastructure from the wars of the 1990s.
The enduring threat of war has combined with economic mismanagement to
produce hyperinflation, de-monetized economies, the collapse of social services,
and the extensive criminalization of economic activities. These problems have
been exacerbated by the legal limbo in which all of these de facto states exist, as
nonrecognized strips of no-man’s-land.307
There has been little progress made towards economic reforms in these states and many
turn to illegal activities to survive. Dwindling and aging populations compound these
issues.308
While these internal drivers are significant, perhaps the most powerful causes for
the perpetuation of these frozen conflicts are external drivers, including the actions of de
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jure states, Russian intervention, and support by other nations and organizations. First,
the actions of the metropolitan states have been detrimental to reconciliation. They each
tried to forcibly restore their sovereignty and, when that failed, they have tried to
repeatedly compel their separatist states through economic, political, and military
means.309
Second, Russia has played an integral role in the outbreak and continuation of
these conflicts. As explained by Dov Lynch,
Since the end of the wars, which the separatist forces won partly with Russian
assistance, Russian policy toward these conflicts has retained enough ambiguity
to reinforce the status quo and protect the de facto states. Russian engagement
operates on several levels, illustrating the multifaceted role that Russia plays in
contributing to the inertia surrounding these conflicts.310
Russia maintains peacekeeping forces along the de facto borders of these separatist
territories and continues to provide political and military support to some if not all of
these states. Its peacekeeping forces and support for separatist movements in sovereign
states played an important role in Russian strategy and, in many cases, initial
peacekeeping forces in these frozen conflicts were drawn from Russian forces already in
the conflict zone that provided support to separatist forces during these conflicts.311 As it
stands, “Russian peacekeeping troops guard the new borders separating the parties. These
new borders have allowed the separatist authorities to get on with state building while the
presence of Russian troops deters the metropolitan states from large-scale aggression.”312
This keeps these conflicts from achieving a resolution.
The presence of these forces continues to undermine the faith of both the de facto
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and metropolitan states in international peacekeepers and diplomacy. The UN and OSCE
do not mandate Russian peacekeeping operations. The difference between Russian and
international peacekeeping missions, according to Dov Lynch, is that
…Russian operations are not deployed to advance ‘international peace and
security,’ although this may be one of their declared secondary goals. According
to Russia’s Military Doctrine, first enunciated in November 1993 and reiterated
ever since, Russian operations are deployed to advance Russian state interests –
this is their primary objective… Russian operations have consistently sought to
alter the prevailing distribution of power in these conflicts in a way that would
advance Russian state interests. In short, Russian forces are more players than
referees. Moreover, Russia’s military presence has served to offset the weakness
of the de facto state armed forces and exacerbated the weakness of the
metropolitan armed forces. The balance of power on the ground is clearly
strengthened in favor of the separatists… In addition, active Russian support of
the separatist forces has reinforced Moldova’s and Georgia’s tendency to dismiss
the legitimacy of the separatists, who are seen as the fifth column of an aggressive
external power.313
Russian peacekeepers operate in a very ad hoc manner. They do not follow standard rules
of engagement, have no timetables for withdrawal, and repeatedly integrate warring
parties into their forces. For instance, “In Moldova, the former 14th Army (now a muchreduced Russian Operational Group) has adopted a peacekeeping role despite having a
history of supporting Transnistrian separatist forces.”314
Furthermore, the international community and NGOs help perpetuate these
conflicts by providing funds and humanitarian support. In helping de facto states with the
day-to-day running of their governments, they are preventing these territories from
dealing with the realities of running a sovereign country and may be preventing them
from seeking to reconcile with the state from which they separated.315
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The longer these conflicts linger unresolved, the greater the potential that they
will reignite and draw in outside actors. According to Dov Lynch, these conflicts have
local, regional, and international implications.
The separatist states have an impact on the security of the states from which they
have seceded – the metropolitan states – and on wider regional developments.
Close to two million people have been displaced by these wars, putting serious
strain on the new states of Moldova, Georgia, and especially Armenia and
Azerbaijan. The economies of these new states are all deeply affected by the
existence of the unrecognized states. The self-declared states have presented
external powers with opportunities to intervene in the region. Russia has used its
peacekeeping operations in Moldova and Georgia as a means to retain influence
over those two states. Conditions within the de facto states have exacerbated
problems of organized crime in the post-Soviet space. The legal limbo in which
they exist has made them breeding grounds and transit zones for international
criminal activities.316
Ultimately, it is impossible to quantify the social, humanitarian, political, and economic
costs of the conflicts within the greater Black Sea region. Locally, these conflicts have
prevented the development of economic infrastructure, stunted political growth and
transparency, and caused states to invest heavily in their security apparatus at the expense
of all other sectors of their states. Furthermore, the legally ambiguous status of these
states means that many are economically reliant on other countries and are thus beholden
to them. Also, they look to illegal means to support their people, either by turning a blind
eye to their citizens’ activities or by officially sanctioning them.
Regionally, the continuation of these conflicts obstructs the creation of a
comprehensive European order as well as the integration of willing nations317 Russian
exploitation of these issues has served its geopolitical goals well and the West has been
unable to find an effective strategy to counter Moscow. While the nations involved in

316
317

Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States, 7.
Blank, “Russia and the Black Sea’s Frozen Conflicts in Strategic Perspective,” 24.

99

these conflicts, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine, perceive a clear
delineation between the West or Russia, few are able to balance between the two
effectively. However, many, like Georgia, are looking specifically to the United States
for support. While the United States maintains many interests in the region, it is neither
willing nor able to provide a security guarantee to these nations and pit itself against
Russia, as Georgia disastrously learned in the 2008 war.
These conflicts have also been detrimental to economic growth. Blockades
between states in the Caucuses prevent the exploitation of natural trade routes. A 2000
study by World Bank argued that opening borders within these states would increase
Azerbaijan’s GDP by 5% and Armenia’s by 30% almost immediately. “In a region where
macroeconomic stability has not led to improvement of people’s lives, the opening of
borders for free trade could make a substantial contribution to the economic transition of
these states and alleviate the general poverty of the population.”318
Internationally, these conflicts have put a strain on many of the major political
and security organizations. NATO is unable to expand in nations where there are ongoing
territorial disputes and the OSCE is seen as impotent as they have been unable to broker
any lasting deal or reconciliation. Furthermore, any one of these conflicts, as seen in
Crimea, has the potential of launching a regional war that could grow even larger and pull
in international powers. “Conflicts that seem to be too remote geographically and too
quiescent militarily to pose a threat to the wider international community are often more
dangerous than they appear.”319
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Resolution
Legal Issues. “Fifteen new states arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Recognized by the world and admitted into the club of states, they acquired the protective
shield of a body of law developed expressly to protect states, with sovereignty as the
foundational norm.”320 However, the promise of statehood was not applied universally
among groups within the post-Soviet space. In addition to the fifteen post-Soviet states,
five other “states” declared their independence following the dissolution of the USSR,
Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. The separatist
movement in Chechnya within the Russian Federation was brutally crushed. However,
the other four, paradoxically with Moscow’s blessing, have persisted, and despite
achieving de facto statehood, they exist in a state of legal ambiguity and limbo. “If, in
past centuries, there existed myriad forms of political organizations – from states to
empires, city-states to dependencies – there are few shapes left at the start of the twentyfirst century. There are states, and there is little else.”321 Without the protection of legal
statehood, these polities remain isolated with few to no rights.
International norms and paradigms are unlikely to change, ensuring that these
conflicts will find no recourse in international law. As a result, the de facto states of the
greater Black Sea region have begun to perceive their situation as the result of a betrayal
of the UN promise of self-determination.
The UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples) of December 14, 1960 set forth
many of the rules of the current regime. The declaration stated that all peoples
have the right to self-determination and to determine freely their political status
and forms of political, economic, and social development… Self-determination
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became a legal and moral right to all non-self-governing territories that are
distinct from the country that administers them.322
The de facto states of the greater Black Sea region are legally lacking in only one thing
for statehood, acceptance by other states. In remaining unrecognized, these states have
little to no voice in the existing international framework, because only a sovereign nationstate holds any rights or power. “De facto states raise the question as to whether the
existence of the state is a formal condition proclaimed by outsiders, or a condition of
effective governance of a defined territory, with a population that is accepting of being
subject to that governance.”323
In Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto
States, Dov Lynch points out that there is a difference between the principle of the right
to self-determination and the rules applying them. “The UN declaration denounced ‘any
attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial
integrity of a country.”324 Also noted by Lynch, this attempted to mitigate the effects of
decolonization by
…enshrining both a limited notion of self-determination and a juridical definition
of criteria for new states…The rule was also expanded to include intrastate
sovereignty: self-determination by all peoples was out of the question, and
secession was condemned outright. The constant border changes and state
territorial shifts that had been the fabric of international affairs until the middle of
the twentieth century were condemned as illegal and disruptive to order.325
What has emerged since has been an attempt to maintain the world’s borders as they were
at the end of the Second World War. There are still many legal barriers to de facto states

322

Ibid., 16-17.
Bobick, “Separatism Redux: Crimea, Transnistria, and Eurasia’s De Facto States,” 3-4.
324
Lynch, Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States, 17-18.
325
Ibid., 18-19.
323

102

and while they continue to be unrecognized by other sovereign nations, there is likely
little recourse to their situation within international law.
Moving Forward. The frozen conflicts that emerged in Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Crimea after the Cold War have been impervious to
resolution. While some seem more likely to flare up than others, namely Crimea and
Nagorno-Karabakh, it is unlikely that these conflicts will remain unresolved indefinitely.
From 2014 to 2016, Crimea was annexed to Russia, Nagorno-Karabakh suffered the most
border casualties since its ceasefire two decades prior, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia
gained recognition of their independence by Russia and a handful of other states, and
tensions between Transnistria and Moldova rose, in no small part because of Russian
military activity within the region. Such heightened tensions over a short time period,
coupled with fears of Western retrenchment, do not bode well for the future of these
frozen conflicts. It would only take a small spark to ignite a conflagration that could
entangle the entire region.
Resolution of these conflicts will likely occur in one of three ways. First, there
could be acceptance of the status quo whereby the separatist movement and de facto state
will gain international recognition and be able to join the brotherhood of states. The
longer these conflicts persist, the more likely this will be the outcome. Second, the de
facto states, through military or political means, could be reabsorbed into their original de
jure state. If this was the result of a concentrated diplomatic effort, it would require a
much more concerted effort by outside organizations and states than is currently
occurring. Reintegration through military means is also a possibility, though it would be
more jarring geopolitically and would require significant development of military assets
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and personnel by a metropolitan state. If Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, or Ukraine were
to restore its sovereignty kinetically, it would likely disrupt the current balance of power
in the region. Finally, a de facto state could be annexed to another state following the
precedent set by Russia in Crimea. This seems unlikely, as only Transnistria has shown a
consistent desire for annexation. Furthermore, annexation may ignite a larger regional
conflict.
In spite of these three options and the seeming paradigm shift by Russia in regards
to how it treats separatist movements in its near abroad since 2014, the prospects for
near-term resolutions to these frozen conflicts are dim. The underlying issues between the
states involved will not resolve themselves organically and Russia is not likely to
withdraw itself from each of these conflicts and states, despite increasing political and
economic cost. At this time, the only way a solution will be reached is if one party
forcibly changes the status quo militarily or if members of the international community
are able to gather support to change the situation diplomatically. However, this would
require Moscow to be in a position of significantly diminished power and influence.
While the United States may be drawn into any of these conflicts, it currently only
serves a diplomatic role. There is little hope of dislodging Russian influence in this
region, though the United States can continue to gain stronger economic and political ties
with the de jure metropolitan states and de facto separatist states and seek ways to foster
reconciliation between them. It is in the United States’ best interests to invest its political
and diplomatic capital wisely before these conflicts flare-up and potentially threaten its
allies and interests.
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